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THE RISE AND EFFECTS OF THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM:  






Communication  between  shareholders  and  corporations  is  necessary  for  everything  from 
distributing  dividends  to  casting  votes  at  the  annual  meeting.    Beginning  in  the  1970's,  such 
communication became increasingly more complicated as more and more shares came to be held 
through intermediaries such as brokers, banks and central depositories.  Today, with a mouse click, we 
can send each other data directly from any location to another at any time, so the difficulty of efficient 
communication between shareholders and companies is an anomaly. How did shareholders and the 
companies  they  own  come  to  be  isolated  from  each  other?    The  answer  is  simple:  a  company's 
"shareholders"  as  they  appear  on  the  stockholders  list  are  not  really  "shareholders",  but  only 
intermediaries. 
One might think that shareholders instructed the intermediaries to take their place as registered 
shareholders  for  the  sake  of  privacy,  but  in  almost  all  cases  they  did  not.    Rather,  Congress 
intentionally  created  the  indirect  relationship  in  1975
1 to  facilitate  the  settlement  of  trades  in 
securities.
2  Since the transfer of a certificated, registered share is very paper intensive, when trading 
volumes in the late 1960's began their climb towards  their present heights, a backlog in paperwork 
                                                       
   Research Associate, Institute for Law and Finance, University of Frankfurt. The following paper is taken 
from the author's doctoral dissertation for the Faculty of Law of the University of Frankfurt, which will 
appear  2007  from  the  Peter  Lang  Publishing  Group  under  the  title:  DER  EINFLUSS  DER 
WERTPAPIERABWICKLUNG  AUF  DIE  AUSÜBUNG  VON  AKTIONÄRSRECHTEN:  EINE  UNTERSUCHUNG  DER 
ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE UND AUSWIRKUNGEN DES AMERIKANISCHEN "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM".  The 
author  would  like  to  thank  Professors  Theodor  Baums  and  Andreas  Cahn  for  their  comments  on  the 
doctoral dissertation. 
1   Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, June 4, 1975, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). 
2   "Settlement of a securities trade involves the final transfer of the securities from the seller to the buyer and 
the  final  transfer  of  funds  from  the  buyer  to  the  seller."  COMMITTEE  ON  PAYMENT  AND  SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEMS  (CPSS)  &  TECHNICAL  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  SECURITIES 
COMMISSIONS  (IOSCO),  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  SECURITIES  SETTLEMENT  SYSTEMS  38  (Nov.  2001); 
MICHAEL SIMMONS, SECURITIES OPERATIONS 261 et seq. (2002); HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: 
LAW AND REGULATION 279 (2004); DAVID LOADER, CLEARING, SETTLEMENT AND CUSTODY 2 (2002). The 
activity of "clearance" is usually discussed together with settlement in the phrase "clearing and settlement," 
as they are both components of the post-trade process. "Clearance" is the confirmation of the terms of the 
trade by the direct market participants, the calculation of the obligations of the counterparties resulting from 
the confirmation process. CPSS & IOSCO, at 37; SCOTT, at 278; LOADER, at 2. This paper discusses the 
process of clearance only insofar as it is integrally tied to settlement. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017206
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2  INTRODUCTION 
threatened to bring down the entire securities market.
3  The SEC and market participants agreed that it 
was necessary to reduce the amount of paperwork connected with share transfers.  There were two, 
basic  ways  of  doing  this:  have  companies  issue  uncertificated,  "electronic"  shares  (referred  to  as 
"dematerialization") that could be transferred by changing entries on the stockholders list, or have 
intermediaries stockpile shares in their vaults and transfer the shares on their books through entries on 
their  custody  accounts  (referred  to  as  "immobilization").    Both  of  these  processes  eliminate  the 
physical  delivery  of  share  certificates.    In  the  case  of  "dematerialization"  the  issuer  itself  creates 
uncertificated  securities  that  can  be  transferred  without  the  delivery  of  paper,  and  through 
"immobilization" one or more intermediaries pool securities in their custody, which allows transfers of 
such  pooled  securities  to  take  place  electronically  on  their  books.    In  effect,  the  process  of 
immobilization allows intermediaries to create something like an uncertificated, derivative entitlement 
based on the underlying pool of securities in their custody.
4  As will be explained in Part II of this 
paper, because § 17A(e) Exchange Act
5 as amended in 1975 requires all exchange-traded securities to 
be  "immobilized",  intermediaries  in  effect  came  to  replace  corporations  as  "issuers"  of  the 
dematerialized "securities" that were transferred as claims against their custody accounts, and they 
also  came  to  replace  shareholders  as  the  persons  registered  on  stockholders  lists  of  corporations.  
Corporations would continue to issue their own shares, but these (certificated) shares could not be 
traded  on  a  securities  exchange  until  they  were  deposited  with  an  intermediary,  which  enabled 
(uncertificated)  claims  on  the  accounts  of  the  intermediary  to  be  traded  efficiently.    Because 
corporations and their states of incorporation refused to make the leap to dematerialization in the 
1970's, intermediaries stepped in to provide this service and thereby in many respects replaced the 
issuers.  In this way, corporate America essentially ceded its direct relationship with shareholders to 
financial intermediaries in order to create a more efficient system of securities settlement.   
The loss of direct communications between issuers and shareholders has caused significant, 
negative  external  effects.
6   The  means  of  communication  foreseen  in  corporate  law  statutes  was 
replaced  by  a  complex  process  of  navigating  through  a  chain  of  intermediaries.
7   In  fact,  the 
inefficiencies created by immobilization were so great that they alone were sufficient to host an entire 
                                                       
3   The causes for and creation of the "indirect holding system" is discussed in Part II of this paper. 
4   The rules applicable to the trading of "security entitlements" are discussed in Part IV of this paper. 
5   15 U.S.C.A. § 78q-1(e) (2000). 
6   A classic case of negative externalities is that of a train throwing sparks that set fire to farmers' fields on 
either side of the tracks. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (6
th ed. 2003). The 
railroad saves money by purchasing and tending only a very narrow easement through the farm fields, but 
the farmers' pay for this savings through their loss of crops.  Thus the costs of the efficient railway system 
are shifted to persons external to it.  
7   Indirect communication through the intermediary chain is discussed in Part III of this paper.  
 
Draft of September 18, 2007. © David C. Donald 
 
3  INTRODUCTION 
industry offering services related to finding shareholders, distributing proxy materials and collecting 
voting instructions.  These very services which feed off of the inefficiency of the indirect holding 
system are nearly the only experts capable of advising the SEC on whether the system can and should 
be changed. 
Technology  has  advanced  dramatically,  yet  the  basic  structure  of  the  system  has  not.  If 
corporations were unable to issue uncertificated shares in the 1970's, and technology of the time was 
not  up  to  creating  a  reliable  network  on  which  transaction  information  could  be  electronically 
distributed, this is certainly not the case today.  Most states now permit uncertificated shares
8 and 
beginning in 2008, all issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock 
Market must be dematerialized.
9  Proprietary information flows safely through leased networks of 
fiber  optic  cables  near  the  speed  of  light.    So  why  are  we  not  seeing  a  new  era  of  direct 
communications between companies and shareholders?  First, very few people other than those who 
profit from the securities settlement structure really look at the settlement system closely, and second, 
such intermediaries have absolutely no reason to advocate that they be cut back out of the issuer-
shareholder loop.  When a shareholder has to deal with a specific broker to receive proxy materials, 
cast votes or sell shares held through that broker, the broker has a strong tie to its customer and always 
knows where she can be contacted.  This is a tie that can dissuade a move to a new broker.  Even if 
financial intermediaries exercise selfless, enlightened judgment, it is reasonable for them to see their 
own services – which they know intimately – as competent, necessary and useful.  Thus, although 
paper certificates, the cause of the "indirect holding system," are rapidly disappearing from the capital 
markets, the system and its negative effects linger like a fossil of an earlier stage of technological 
development. 
This paper explains why the indirect holding system was created, the effects it has on those 
outside of the intermediary circle, and why it remains.  Part I briefly reviews the transfer of registered 
securities under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code to explain why securities transfers can be 
very paper intensive.  Part II describes the "paper crunch" that nearly brought down the U.S. markets 
in the late 1960's, the solutions that were considered at the time, and the legislative imposition of 
"immobilization" as the chosen solution.  Part III explains the negative externalities of this solution on 
shareholder communications.  Part IV describes the system of securities transfer as it now exists, and 
Part V offers some possible explanations of why, although certificated securities are really no longer 
in use, direct shareholder communications show no sign of returning. 
                                                       
8   EGON GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS § 1:13, p. 1-49 (updated to 2006); Jill M. Considine, 
Escaping the Parallel Universe of Paper Certificates, SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS (July 12, 2004). 
9   See Part IV, Section 4.  
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4  I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
1.  Transfer of Certificated, Registered Shares 
(a)  Direct Transaction between Seller and Buyer 
The law applicable to transfers of shares of stock in the United States will be some form of 
Article 8, Investment Securities, of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which has been adopted in 
all 50 states.
10 Article 8 was substantially amended in 1978 and again in 1994 to adapt it to changing 
techniques for securities settlement.
11  The 1978 amendments focused on strengthening the rules for 
the  transfer of uncertificated  securities, and  the 1994 amendments  then created  a  set  of  rules  for 
transferring claims on securities held in custody accounts within the "indirect holding system", which 
had in the meantime become a hardened fact of the capital markets.
12  Neither of these amendments 
made substantial changes to the existing common law rules for the direct sale and conveyance of 
certificated, registered shares.  To transfer ownership of a registered security, it is essentially only 
necessary that there be a "voluntary transfer of possession."
13 Because shares are immaterial and exist 
independently from their certification in paper, certificates serve as a sign of title.
14  The effective 
delivery of the security certificate must be complete and unconditional,
15 although delivery may take 
place through an escrow arrangement or other intermediating party.
16  However, as will be explained 
in more detail below, if a securities intermediary were to act as the intermediating party, the security 
would have to be held in the account of and indorsed to the buyer for the transfer of a security to take 
place.
17  
Although no writing is necessary for the valid transfer of a security,
18 most sales take place with 
written contracts or orders evidencing the intent of voluntary transfer.
19 Registered shares can thus be 
                                                       
10   Information on adoption of the UCC by individual states is available from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) at http://www.nccusl.org. 
11   See Uniform Commercial Code, Revised Article 8 (1994 Revision). Investment Securities, Prefatory Note 
(hereinafter "U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note"). 
12   See U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note. 
13   GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:2, p. 6-4 et seq.; MARK S. RHODES, TRANSFER OF STOCK 145 (6
th ed. 1985, 
Supp. 2005). 
14   RHODES, supra note 13, at 140.  
15   Delivery subject to condition precedent becomes valid only after the condition has occurred. GUTTMAN, 
supra note 8, at § 6:2, p. 6-6, and Norton v. Digital Applications, Inc., 305 A. 2d 656 (Del. Ch. 1973). 
16   GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:2, p. 6-6 et seq., and Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F. 2d 1046, 1054, note 
7 (2nd Cir. 1969). 
17   If a securities intermediary were to act on behalf of the purchaser in acquiring possession of the security 
certificate, the purchaser would receive only a security entitlement against the intermediary rather than 
ownership of the security itself, unless the certificate were in registered form and registered in the name of 
the purchaser or specially indorsed to the purchaser. U.C.C., § 8-301(a)(3) (2005). See Part IV, Section 2.a. 
18   U.C.C. § 8-113 (2005); GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:13, p. 6-41 et seq.  
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5  I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
transferred  without  indorsement.
20  However,  a  buyer  who  receives  delivery  of  an  unendorsed 
registered share has neither the right to demand entry on the stockholders list
21 nor good title in the 
face of competing claims to the security.
22 The notion of a bona fide purchaser receiving a negotiable 
instrument free of adverse claims has been somewhat altered in the post-1994 version of Article 8 with 
the introduction of the concept of "protected purchaser", a term borrowed from the Convention on 
International Bills and Notes prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).
23  In order to qualify as a "protected purchaser", the buyer must (1) give value;
24 (2) not 
have notice of any adverse claim to the security;
25 and (3) obtain control of it.
26  The concept of 
"control" is very important in Article 8, and for a certificated, registered security it means that the 
security is delivered to the purchaser indorsed to him or in blank by an effective indorsement or is 
registered by the issuer in the name of the purchaser.
27 A protected purchaser acquires an interest in 
the  security  free  of  any  adverse  claim.
28   Thus  registered  securities  are  usually  transferred  by 
indorsement and delivery.
29 The UCC defines the term "indorsement" as a signature that "alone or 
accompanied by other words" is applied to a security certificate or a separate document to assign, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19   GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at § 6:13, 6-42; RHODES, supra note 8, at 135. 
20   U.C.C., § 8-301(a) (2005); GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:3, p. 6-10 et seq.; RHODES, supra note 13, at 145; 
Jones v. Central States Inv. Co., 654 P.2d 727, 733 (Wyo. 1982); Fellows v. Miller, 490 N.E. 2d. 992, 994 
(3
rd Dist. Ill. 1986). 
21   U.C.C., § 8-401 (2005), and GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:1, p. 7-3. 
22   U.C.C., § 8-303(a)(3) and § 8-106(b) (2005).  
23   U.C.C. § 8-303, Off. Comm. 4 (2005). See Art. 29 of the Convention on International Bills and Notes 
prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.C.C. § 8-303, Off. Comm. 
(2005) and GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:13, p. 7-34 et seq. 
24   "Value" is defined in U.C.C., § 1-201(44) (2005), and is somewhat broader than the ordinary understanding 
of the related concept "consideration", as it includes past performances, such as a credit that has already 
been granted. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:13, pp. 7-34 et seq.; Matthysse v. Securities Processing 
Services, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Prisbrey v. Nobel, 505 F. 2d. 170, 176 et seq. 
(10
th Cir. 1974). 
25   The concept "adverse claim" as used in Article 8 is restricted to "a property interest in a financial asset and 
that it is a violation of the rights of the claimant for another person to hold, transfer, or deal with the 
financial asset." U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(1) (2005). The concept of "notice" includes both actual notice and the 
deliberate refusal of inquiring behind suspicious facts. U.C.C. § 8-105 (2005). See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, 
at § 7:14, p. 7-41 et seq., and SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 386 F.3d 438, 447 et seq. (2d Cir. 2004). 
26   U.C.C. § 8-303 (2005). 
27   U.C.C. § 8-106(b) (2005); see GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:19, pp. 6-60 et seq. The concept of "control" 
is especially important for receiving securities as collateral. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6a:13, and 
Howard Darmstadter, Sandra M. Rocks & Steven O. Weise, A Model "Ac-count Control Agreement" under 
the New Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 BUS. LAW 139 (1997). "Control" over a registered 
security is achieved by obtaining control of the security indorsed to the holder or in blank, or if the issuer 
registers the holder in the stockholders list. § 8-106(a) and (b).  
28   U.C.C. § 8-303(b) (2005).  
29   RHODES (2005), p. 146.  
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6  I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
transfer, or redeem the security or to grant a power to do the same.
30 Thus an indorsement can also be 
applied to a stock power to transfer certificated or uncertificated securities. A valid stock power must 
sufficiently describe the securities, the seller and the buyer, as well as indicate the intent to transfer.
31 
The recipient of a stock power has a right to demand entry on the stockholders list.
32 Stock powers 
present  a number of  advantages  over  indorsing  individual certificates, and  are thus often used  in 
practice.
33  
The UCC creates a number of default warranties in connection with a transfer of securities.  
Unless  otherwise  agreed,  the  seller  and  all  indorsers  warrant  the  purchaser  that  the  certificate  is 
genuine and unaltered, that they do not know of any fact that might impair the validity of the security, 
that there is no adverse claim to the security, that the transfer does not violate any restriction on 
transfer, and that the indorser – if a representative of the appropriate person – has actual authority to 
apply the indorsement.
34  In effect, the transferor warrants that the purchaser will be able to register the 
transfer of title on the stockholders list.
35  In follows that the concept of "good delivery" includes 
assistance as necessary to effect the registration.
36 The purchaser may demand that the seller provide 
proof of authority to transfer and other documents requisite to obtain registration of transfer.
37 Such 
other requisite documents would today include a signature guarantee, letters of administration and tax 
documentation.
38   Required  documentation  can  also  multiply  because  of  the  number  of  parties 
involved.  Buyers demand signature guarantees and proof of powers because issuers will demand these 
                                                       
30   U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(11) (2005). 
31   Identification of the parties would include their taxpayer identification numbers and identification of the 
securities would be made by reference to their "CUSIP" number. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 8:5, p. 8-
10, and Bradford Trust Co. of Boston v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 208, 212 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
32   GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 12:1, p. 12-2, and RHODES, supra note 13, at 140. 
33   Stock powers present at least two advantages over indorsements directly on a security certificate. First, the 
power to transfer and the security certificates themselves can be transported separately, which reduces the 
risks if either is lost, and second, it allows sales and repurchases or security transfers that turn around 
quickly to accomplished without cancellation of the original certificate. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at 
§ 8:2, p. 8-6; Matter of Legal, Braswell Government Securities Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 324 (5
th Cir. 1981); 
Cosmopolitan Credit and Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman Dillon and Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 
1981), and RHODES, supra note 13, at 146 et seq. 
34   U.C.C. § 8-108(a) (2005); also see GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:4, p. 7-9 et seq.  
35   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:1, p. 7-3 et seq. 
36   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 9:5 p. 9-10. 
37   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:1, p. 7-4. This is particularly true in the case of uncertificated securities 
because both delivery and control of a security are achieved through this registration, as will be discussed in 
Section 2 below.  
38   See GUTTMAN, supra note  9, at § 7:1, p. 7-4, footnote 26; also see U.C.C. § 8-307 (2005).  
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7  I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
documents before effecting the registration of transfer,
39 especially in light of the fact that an issuer 
that  registers  a  transfer  pursuant  to  an  ineffective  indorsement  or  instruction  is  strictly  liable  for 
wrongful registration.
40 If a signature guarantee is in provided, the gurantor will then bear any costs of 
such liability.
41  
From the above, it is obvious that even in a direct transaction between seller and buyer, the 
transfer  of  a  certificated  registered  share  entails  a  significant  amount  of  paperwork:  either  the 
certificate or a stock power must be indorsed, the signature guaranteed, authority to transfer title 
documented,  and  the  stock  certificate  and  the  other  documentation  delivered,  not  to  mention  the 
registration of transfer on the stockholders list, the destruction of the old certificate and the issue of a 
new one.  Because a transaction on a securities exchange will involve more parties, the necessary 
paperwork increases, as each party demands the basic documentation plus any other documentation 
considered  necessary  to  decrease  its  risk  or  increase  its  rating  vis-à-vis  the  next  party  in  the 
transactional chain.  
(b)  Transaction on a Securities Exchange 
Transactions on securities exchanges rarely take place directly between the seller and the buyer. 
In sales and purchases by persons other than brokers and specialists, the owner of the security will 
instruct a broker to sell, the broker
42 will transfer the order to the exchange floor/system or a market 
maker, where it will be matched wholly or partially with one or more buy orders.
43  Once the order is 
executed, the seller will have to deliver the executed certificate(s) to his broker so that the selling 
broker can deliver it to the buying broker, market maker, specialist, or central counterparty.  Once the 
buying broker receives delivery, she will have to deliver to the issuer's transfer agent with a request for 
registration of transfer on the stockholder list.  The latter, after inspecting all necessary documentation, 
will register the transfer, cancel the old certificate, and issue a new certificate to the buyer.
44 Thus, 
beyond indorsement of the certificate and its delivery, each stage of the transaction will demand the 
                                                       
39   U.C.C. § 8-402 (2005); also see GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 14:1, pp. 14-2 et seq. and § 9:5, p. 9-10. 
40   U.C.C. § 8-404 (2005); also see GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 14:1, pp. 14-1 et seq. 
41   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 14:10, p. 14-9 et seq.; Quealy v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 
464 So. 2d. 930, 939 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
42   Except perhaps when selling a large block, a broker would act for its own account rather than in the name of 
a disclosed principal. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 9:9, pp. 9-16 et seq. 
43   See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ & RETO FRANCIONI, EQUITY MARKETS IN ACTION 4, 156 et seq. (on order driven 
market), 191 et seq. (on intermediated market)   (2004). 
44   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 9:9, pp. 9-18 et seq. and DONALD T. REGAN, A VIEW FROM THE STREET 
100 (1972).  
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8  I. THE TRANSFER OF REGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER ARTICLE 8 UCC 
documents, guarantees
45 and assurances that constitute "good delivery" on the respective exchange.
46  
The amount of manual paperwork connected to the sale of a single share can therefore be significant. 
2.  Transfer of Uncertificated, Registered Shares 
Uncertificated shares are transferred by registering the transfer on the books of the issuer.
47 
Thus the "delivery" of uncertificated shares, which is essential for transferring certificated shares, 
takes place either by registering the name of the transferee on the stockholders list or by a third party 
(who is not a securities intermediary)
48 declaring to hold the share on behalf of the transferee.
49 In 
order to attain the status of a protected purchaser, the buyer of uncertificated shares will still have to 
give value, not have notice of any adverse claim, and obtain control of the security. The absence of a 
certificate does not change either the notion of giving value or that of having notice of adverse claims, 
but it does change the manner in which control over the security is achieved. A transferee obtains 
control  over  an  uncertificated  share  by  having  her  name  entered  on  the  stockholders  list.
50 Thus 
registration  by  a  transfer  agent  would  fulfill  the  requirements  both  of  "delivery"  and  "control".
51 
Because parties to the transfer would still likely require a signature guarantee on the stock power or 
transfer instruction used to transfer the uncertificated securities,
52 the transfer would simply require 
payment of value, a transfer instruction or power with guaranteed signature, and registration of the 
transfer.
53 
For this type of transfer to be executed on a securities exchange, two requirements must be met.  
First, the shares of the issuers traded on the exchange must be uncertificated (dematerialized), and 
second, the securities settlement system must be connected to the master securityholder lists kept by 
the transfer agents of the issuers.  As Part II will explain, because neither of these conditions were met 
                                                       
45   The NYSE has developed a program referred to as "medallion guarantees" to standardize and rationalize the 
guarantee  process  for  exchange  transactions.  See  Rules  of  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  Rule  200, 
available at http://rules.nyse.com (hereinafter "NYSE Rules"). 
46   For example, the "good delivery" rules used on U.S. exchanges may well limit the number of people who 
can provide an endorsement to market participants or persons who do not act in a fiduciary capacity, so as 
to reduce the risk of forged or unauthorized endorsements. See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 9:19, p. 9-40. 
47   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:4, p. 6-12. 
48   As  explained  above,  if  a  securities  intermediary  were  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  purchaser  in  acquiring 
possession of the security certificate, the purchaser would receive only a security entitlement against the 
intermediary rather than ownership of the security itself, unless the certificate were in registered form and 
registered in the name of the purchaser or specially indorsed to the purchaser. U.C.C., § 8-301(a)(3) (2005). 
49   U.C.C. § 8-301(b) (2005). 
50   U.C.C. § 8-106(c) (2005). 
51   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6:4, pp. 6-12 et seq. 
52   U.C.C. § 8-402 (2005). 
53   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 9:6, pp. 9-11 et seq.  
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9  II. THE CREATION OF THE "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM" 
when  trading  volumes  reached  a  point  at  which  the  paperwork  (indorsement,  physical  delivery, 
cancellation,  issue  and  delivery  of  new  certificates)  could  no  longer  keep  up  with  trading, 
intermediaries  were  forcefully  inserted  between  issuers  and  their  shareholders  by  law  to  allow 
transactions to be settled in a dematerialized manner on the books of the intermediaries. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM" 
1. The "Paper Crunch"  
Up  until  the  1970's,  most  securities  firms  took  care  of  their  securities  transfer  paperwork 
through the manual work of clerks.  A study performed by North American Rockwell Information 
Systems found that brokers might use an average of 33 different forms for a single security transfer.
54 
As  trading  volume  steadily  increased  in  the  late  1960's,  brokers  fell  behind  in  this  "back  office" 
processing  of  transaction  settlements.    Although  the  volume  was  slight  by  today's  standards,  the 
unforeseen growth had dramatic effects.  Daily volume on the NYSE more than quadrupled from 
about three million shares per day in 1960 to approximately 13 million shares per day in 1968,
55 
without the industry taking any serious steps to increase the efficiency of their settlement activity.
56 
The increase was loaded mostly into the end of the period, and from 1966 to 1967 annual trading 
volume  increased  by  33 %,  reaching  2.53  billion  shares.
57   During  1969,  the  inability  of  some 
brokerage  firms  to  settle  transactions  created  massive  backups  in  deliveries,  so  that  unperformed 
obligations could range from 70% to 200% of a firm's total assets.
58  Firms were forced to cover short 
positions caused by missing securities by making open market purchases.  This worked as long as cash 
flow was high, but as the market turned downward in 1970, brokers found their working capital 
diminished,  which  forced  them  into  default  on  outstanding  delivery  obligations  for  which  the 
securities  had  been  lost  or  misplaced.
59   As  a  result,  over  100  brokerage  firms  either  entered 
bankruptcy or were acquired by stronger competitors.
60  Although this is not remembered as one of the 
                                                       
54   U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS 
AND DEALERS 176 (December 1971) (hereinafter "UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY"); also see JOEL SELIGMAN, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
AND MODERN FINANCE 489 (3
rd ed. 2003); HURD BARUCH, WALL STREET: SECURITIY RISK 280 (1971), and 
REGAN, supra note 44, at 163. 
55   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 28, and BARUCH , supra note 54, at 85 et seq. 
56   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 28, 96. 
57   Id. at 13. 
58   Id. at 102. Losses from fails and related unperformed obligations climbed nearly 300% between 1961 and 
1969. See Id. at 100. 
59   Id. at 96. 
60   See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 183 (1975); BARUCH , supra note 54, at 189 et seq., CHRIS WELLES, THE LAST 
DAYS OF THE CLUB 134 (1975).  
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10  II. THE CREATION OF THE "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM" 
more important market crises of U.S. financial history, it was the largest challenge to the securities 
exchanges since the crash of 1929, and led directly to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.
61 The 
few references it receives in legal history refer to with peculiar epitaphs such as the "back-office 
crisis"
62 or the "paper crunch"
63 because it was caused by the simple inability of brokers to process the 
paperwork connected with the settlement of the growing number of exchange transactions.
64  
Both the SEC
65 and a number of authors writing in the 1970's, including Chris Welles,
66 Hurd 
Baruch,
67 and  Donald  Regan,
68 documented  in  some  detail  the  circumstances  that  led  to  this 
improbable  crisis.    During  the  "go-go"  years  of  the  1960's,  a  number  of  brokerage  firms  greatly 
expanded their sales forces without similarly investing to increase the capacity of their "back office" 
operations.
69  Welles speculates that the monopolistic position of the New York brokers, who at this 
time enjoyed both fixed commissions and rules against outside competition, dissuaded them from 
tying up funds to improve their internal systems by installing the type of automated data processing 
that had been offered to them since the 1950's.
70  Yet as the number of orders and transactions grew, so 
did the volume of unfulfilled deliveries. One relatively large brokerage firm that had been a member 
of the NYSE since 1941, Dempsey-Tegeler & Company, Inc.,
71 saw its unfulfilled deliveries climb 
from about $ 2.6 million in 1968 to approximately $ 12 million in 1969, a sum which was twice the 
firm's total assets.
72  
During the last six months of 1968 and part of 1969, the volume of failed deliveries forced the 
NYSE to close one day per week and then hold abbreviated trading hours in order to give members 
time to catch up on their paperwork.
73  Even after taking such measures, however, in December 1968 
                                                       
61   S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 183 (1975). 
62   BARUCH, supra note 54, at 85. 
63   WELLES, supra note 60, at 134; GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at §1:13, p. 1-49, and James S. Rogers, An Essay 
on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some Lessons from the Article 8 Revision, 
31 Idaho L. Rev. 689, 691 (1995). 
64   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 28. Also see WELLES, supra note 60, at 172 et seq. and 
REGAN, supra note 44, at 104 et seq. 
65   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54. 
66   WELLES, supra note 60. 
67   BARUCH, supra note 54. 
68   REGAN, supra note 44. 
69   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 11 et seq. 
70   WELLES, supra note 60, at 125 et seq. 
71   WELLES, supra note 60, at 212. 
72   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 101 et seq. 
73   REGAN, supra note 44, at 104, and SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 219-20.  
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11  II. THE CREATION OF THE "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM" 
the NYSE still showed more than $ 4 billion in outstanding delivery failures,
74 which included around 
$ 11 million from the accounts of Dempsey-Tegeler alone.
75  Because securities often carry rights to 
distributions  such  as  dividend  or  interest  payments,  the  backlog  of  paperwork  meant  that  such 
distributions  were  not  paid  on  time.  For  example,  in  1969  Dempsey-Tegeler  failed  to  pay  out 
approximately 80% of the dividends due its clients although it had actually received the funds from the 
respective issuers.
76  During the same year, even the much more competent Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. did not pay about $ 21 million in dividends to its clients on time.
77  In order to 
cover such outstanding obligations, some brokers illegally used the free balances of their clients to 
cover obligations due to others.
78 
Some firms tried to shift to automated systems on the run during the bull market – occasionally 
with disastrous  results.
79   These  failed  attempts  to  automate  may well  have  colored  the decision-
making at a later date, when the SEC and market participants chose between high- and low-tech 
solutions to the securities settlement problem.  One example that Welles describes in detail is the ill-
fated attempt of McDonnell & Company, a prosperous brokerage firm in the 1960's, to make the 
transition  to  automated  settlement.    When  the  booming  market  approached  its  apex  in  1968, 
McDonnell paid a computer firm named Data Architects about $ 3 million to design and install a 
computerized settlement system to take over the settlement burden from the firm's flagging team of 
back-office clerks.
80  Because during the installation period McDonnell continued to engage in high 
volume trading, it was forced to outsource much of its paperwork to another firm at significant cost.
81  
Unfortunately for both McDonnell and Data Architects, the latter's "innovative" system design had 
some  bugs  and  the  contractors  failed  to  formulate  a  feasible  transition  plan  or  train  McDonnell 
employees on the new system; in addition, these same employees also apparently sabotaged the new 
system out of fear that they would lose their jobs to a computer.
82  As a result, the transition never 
occurred, and in December of 1968 McDonnell had about $ 9.3 million in securities that it could not 
place to specific owner-customers and unfulfilled deliveries of approximately $ 1.3 million for which 
                                                       
74   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 19; also see REGAN, supra note 44, at 104. 
75   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 105. 
76   Id. at 109 et seq. 
77   Id. at 109. 
78   Id. at 123 et seq.; also see BARUCH , supra note 54, at 21 et seq. and 33 et seq. 
79   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 13 et seq. 
80   WELLES, supra note 60, at 196. 
81   Id. at 195. 
82   Id. at 187 et seq.  
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12  II. THE CREATION OF THE "INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM" 
it simply could not find the securities to be delivered in settlement.
83  Pinched between the cost of 
outsourcing its settlement activities and the funds it needed to cover its own back-office shortfalls, 
McDonnell  apparently  turned  to  securities  fraud.    It  purchased  200,000  shares  of  the  inept  Data 
Architects for a penny a share, offered the shares to the public in an IPO that it arranged for the 
company without disclosing its own disastrous experience with the issuer's work, and pocketed about 
$ 2  million  from  the  transaction.
84    However,  as  the  market  turned  downward  in  late  1969, 
McDonnell's cash flow was still not sufficient to fund both the open market purchases necessary to 
replace lost and misplaced securities and the cost of its outsourced settlement work, so it was forced 
into  bankruptcy.
85   At  the  same  time,  the  SEC  took  action  against  the  broker  for  the  misleading 
omission  in  the  prospectus  it  used  to  sell  the  Data  Architect  shares.
86 Although  McDonnell  was 
liquidated in the spring of 1970, it took clerical employees until 1974 to straighten out the firm's 
securities settlement records.
87  
As mentioned above, about 100 other brokerage firms met comparable fates.
88  Congress first 
reacted by creating deposit guarantee insurance for retail securities holders through the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA)
89.  It also instructed the SEC to investigate the causes of the 
crisis, which resulted in a very detailed account of broker activity in the 1960's.
90 On the basis of this 
Report and other considerations, Congress passed the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.
91  The 
provision of this Act that imposed immobilization and created the "indirect holding system" is, like the 
"back  office"  itself,  not  the  most  memorable  of  the  1975  Amendments.    The  Act  is  primarily 
remembered for eliminating the system of fixed commissions that had protected brokers' income since 
1792
92 and introducing the national market system program, which is designed to allow trades and 
information  to  flow  freely  between  all  national  and  regional  exchanges,
93 a  project  that  is  still 
                                                       
83   Id. at 196. 
84   Id. at 196. 
85   Id. at 206 et seq.; also see SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 60, at 29. 
86   WELLES, supra note 60, at 198. 
87   Id. at 208 et seq. 
88   S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 183 (1975); SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 1366, BARUCH, supra 
note 54, at 189 et seq., WELLES, supra note 60, at 134. 
89   The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-584, 84 Stat 1636, (1970) codified in 15 USC 
§78 aaa et seq. 
90   See SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at Chapters II, III & IV. 
91   Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, supra note 1. 
92   15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION §7-D.2 (3
rd ed. 2004). 
93   15 U.S.C. § 78k-1; S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 180 et seq. (1975); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §7-A.1.  
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incomplete and actively pursued today.
94  The national market system was mainly designed to open up 
isolated, uncompetitive pockets of trading and price information to all market participants,
95 thereby 
promoting competition between the NYSE and regional exchanges and segments,
96 but it was also 
intended to create a national system for clearing and settlement.
97 
2. Imposing "Immobilization" as the Foundation for Securities Settlement 
(a)  The SEC's Investigation 
The  major  stock  exchanges,  the  National  Association  of  Securities  Dealers  (NASD),  and  a 
number  of  financial  trade  associations  had  investigated  the  clearing  and  settlement  process  for 
securities transactions during the 1960's and produced detailed reports on and recommendations for 
ways to increase the efficiency and capacity of securities settlement.  On June 29, 1971, four months 
after the NASDAQ system (now the Nasdaq stock exchange) began operations,
98 the SEC convened a 
conference of major market participants to discuss and evaluate the existing recommendations and 
possible solutions for the paperwork crisis.
99  A number of studies were aired and discussed, and most 
recommendations went to the rationalization and standardization of the settlement process.
100 
A study that NASD commissioned Arthur D. Little to perform recommended that individual 
long and short positions of brokers in specific classes of securities be set off against each other so that 
only the net amounts of funds and securities would actually have to be delivered.  The study argued 
that through netting all outstanding positions on a multilateral basis, the number of deliveries that 
would actually have to be performed would be drastically reduced.
101  Such netting had successfully 
                                                       
94   See Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information 
and  the  Future  of  the  National  Market  System,  57  BUS.  LAW.  637,  640  et  seq.  (2002);  Final  Rule: 
Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 29, 2005). 
95   15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(D); S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 187 et seq. (1975); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 
§7-A.1 
96   15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C); S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 192 et seq. (1975); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 
§7-A.1. 
97   15 U.S.C. § 78q-1; S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 183 et seq. (1975); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6. 
98   The NASDAQ system replaced mimeographed lists of the ask and bid prices of OTC dealers, referred to as 
"the sheets", which were released on a daily basis in New York. NASDAQ published OTC quotations by 
participating  market  makers  electronically  and  simultaneously  country-wide.  The  system  entered  into 
operation  on  February  8,  1971.  See WELLES,  supra  note  60,  at  286.  This  system  became  a  "national 
securities exchange" on January 13, 2006. See In the Matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market 
LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange; Findings, Opinion, and Order of the Commission, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006). 
99   See SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 168. 
100   See Id. at 173 et seq. 
101   See Id. at 175.  
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been used since the 1870's by the Vienna Giro and Depository Association,
102 and is still considered an 
essential technique for securities settlement.
103 Another study prepared by North American Rockwell 
Information Systems on commission from the American Stock Exchange focused on standardizing 
documentation.  It recommended that buy and sell orders be made machine readable.
104  Such machine 
readable standardization was to an extent adopted and is still recommended as best practice by expert 
committees like the Group of Thirty.
105  Both North American Rockwell and the American Bankers 
Association  recommended  that  securities  certificates  themselves  be  issued  in  the  form  of  "punch 
cards", a machine-readable format that was the precursor of the bar code.
106  Although the market 
never saw the introduction of punch card stock certificates on a broad scale, the idea did lead to the 
creation of the "CUSIP" number, which is still used in the United States as the primary means of 
identifying separate classes of securities.
107 
Another  main  issue  discussed  at  the  meeting  was  perhaps  more  pressing  than  individual, 
rationalizing measures: that was the choice between two competing models of securities settlement.  
One model was to create a decentralized network linking issuers' transfer agents on which transfers of 
uncertificated (dematerialized) securities could be recorded by book entry; the other model was to 
create a centralized depository in which share certificates would be kept in custody (immobilized), so 
that interests in such shares could be transferred by book entries on its accounts.  Both models would 
eliminate the troublesome physical delivery of shares, but use of the first model would have required 
issuers themselves to take on the burden of "dematerializing" share certificates and use of the second 
model would allow intermediaries to create a kind of feigned dematerialization by locking the material 
certificates in their vaults and acting as custodians and fiduciaries. 
The decentralized model, often referred to as a "Transfer Agent Depository," or TAD,
108 was 
projected  in  its  most  articulate  form  by  a  study  that  the  firm  of  Lybrand,  Ross  Brothers  and 
                                                       
102   See THEODOR HEINSIUS, ARNO HORN & JÜRGEN THAN, DEPOGESTZ – KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER DIE 
VERWAHRUNG UND ANSCHAFFUNG VON WERTPAPIEREN VOM 4. FEBRUAR 1937 § 5 margin no. 1 (1975). 
103   CPSS  &  IOSCO,  supra  note  2,  Recommendation  4;  THE  GROUP  OF  THIRTY,  GLOBAL CLEARING  AND 
SETTLEMENT: A PLAN OF ACTION, Recommendation 16 (2003). In December 1969 NASD established the 
"National Clearing Corporation", which as discussed in Part IV still operates under the name "National 
Securities  Clearing  Corporation"  as  a  subsidiary  and  the  clearing  entity  of  The  Depository  Trust  and 
Clearing Company.  
104   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 176 et seq. 
105   See THE GROUP OF THIRTY supra note 103, Recommendations 1 and 2. 
106   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 183. 
107   See  Id.  at  34  et  seq.,  198.  CUSIP  numbers  are  assigned  by  the  Committee  on  Uniform  Security 
Identification Procedures, for which the acronym stands. 
108   See Id. at 180;  SEC, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICE OF RECORDING THE OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES IN THE RECORDS  
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Montgomery had prepared in 1969, and foresaw a decentralized network of electronic shareholder 
registers on which transfers in uncertificated shares would be entered.
109  The Rockwell Study referred 
to above also proposed a comparable system,
110 and given that Rockwell was working on commission 
from NASD, it is wholly possible that the choice of this model was shaped by the decentralized, 
computer-based NASDAQ system that NASD had just launched.  In this model, shareholders would 
continue  to  be  registered  on  the  stockholders  list,  and  physical  delivery  of  certificates  would  be 
obviated  by  eliminating  the  certificates  themselves,  thus  increasing  settlement  efficiency  without 
walling issuers off from shareholders.  In the 1970's, however, this model presented two, massive 
practical obstacles and one political consideration.  First and foremost, it required as a prerequisite that 
all  of  the  shares  traded  on  stock  exchanges  be  dematerialized,  which  would  potentially  require 
amendment of all the corporate statutes of the 50 states.  Second, it required a secure network capable 
of carrying settlement information between the stock exchanges and the transfer agent of every listed 
company,  a  technical  feat  whose  feasibility  was  rightly  questioned  in  1971.
111    The  political 
consideration  only  amplified  the  severity  of  the  technical  problems:  if  following  the  creation  of 
NASDQ, securities settlement were also decentralized and by electronic links spread throughout the 
country,  this  would  further  weaken  America's  previously  undisputed  and  then  troubled  financial 
center, New York City. 
The  Banking  and  Securities  Industry  Committee  (BASIC),  which  represented  leading  U.S. 
banks  and  securities  exchanges,  explained  that  the  NYSE  had  already  set  up  a  central  securities 
depository – the "Central Certificate Service", or CCS – and that they considered it the best way to 
ensure efficient settlement of transactions.
112  Because the most burdensome aspects of transferring 
shares were indorsing and delivering the old certificates, registering transfers on the stockholders list 
and issuing new certificates, transfer could be simplified by always keeping the shares in the same 
name: either the nominee of the central depository or one of its participating firms (referred to as 
"street names") would be entered as the registered shareholder.
113  This technique was as reliable as 
the rhythm of a Strauss waltz, for the Vienna Giro and Depository Association began using it only five 
                                                                                                                                                                      
OF THE ISSUER IN OTHER THAN THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNER OF SUCH SECURITIES  41 et seq. 
(December 1976) (hereinafter "STREET NAME STUDY"). 
109   See SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 191 et seq.; WELLES, supra note 60, at 320 et seq. 
110   See Id. at 177 et seq. 
111   A study prepared by the United States Trust Plan recommended setting up a decentralized settlement on the 
order of the 12 zones of the Federal Reserve System. Id. at 193 et seq. 
112   Id. at 184 et seq. 
113   See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6.  
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years after the Blue Danube was first performed in 1867.
114  Like other structures based on deposit in a 
pool  and  issue  of  representative  instruments,  such  as  American  Depository  Receipts  and  the 
securitization of loans, one kind of instrument (here certificated securities) would be deposited into the 
pool held by a fiduciary and another kind (here book-entry securities) would be exchanged in the 
market "on the other side" of the fiduciary relationship.  Pursuant to the logic of this model, the greater 
the percentage of a market's securities held in a single depository and registered in a single name, the 
greater  the  number  of  transactions  that  can  be  traded  as  book-entry  transfers  on  the  depository's 
accounts.
115 Thus the most efficient exploitation of this model would be to place all outstanding shares 
of an economy in one depository and in the name of one person, so that transfers on that person's 
books would resemble a complete dematerialization of the market.  Issuers and shareholders would 
cede their direct relationship to each other in exchange for not having to worry about dematerializing 
shares or arranging for a system of transfer.  This model would significantly strengthen the function 
and status of the market center where all of the shares in circulation would be deposited – here New 
York and (originally) the NYSE.  This model had two great advantages: it was based on a tried and 
tested banking technique and it was then currently in operation under the auspices of the country's 
most respected financial institutions. 
Both models would have drastically reduced the paperwork connected with securities transfers. 
The 1971 SEC Report explains that most market participants backed the dematerialized model, but 
were concerned that it could not be implemented quickly and safely.
116  Although the decentralized 
network  would  have  preserved  the  relationship  between  shareholders  and  issuers,  and  indeed 
resembled the technique used in the early joint stock companies where "members" could only transfer 
their (uncertificated) shares on the register at the seat of the company,
117 it would also have meant 
making  dematerialized  shares  acceptable  to  the  legislatures  of  all  50  states.    In  addition,  a  Rand 
                                                       
114   See HEINSIUS, HORN & THAN, supra note 102, at § 5 margin no. 1. 
115   See SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 187. 
116   See Id. at 168, 173. 
117   GUTTMAN,  supra  note  8,  at  §1:6,  p. 1-16  ("The  original  concept  of  share  participation  in  a  corporate 
enterprise was one of a 'membership' relation, not necessarily evidenced by any instrument but clearly 
recorded on the register of members maintained by the secretary."); Egon Guttman & Thomas P. Lemke, 
The Transfer of Securities in Organized Markets: A Comparative Study of Clearing Agencies in the United 
States  of  America,  Britian  and  Canada,  19  Osgoode  Hall  L.J.  400  et  seq.  (1981);  Ella  Gepken-Jager, 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, in VOC 1602-2002: 400 YEARS OF COMPANY LAW 43, 63 (Gepken-
Jager, van Solinge & Timmerman, eds., 2005); James S. Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 
Cardozo  L.  Rev.  471,  474  (1990)  ("It  is,  however,  far  less  clear  whether  paper  representations  of 
investments in the seventeenth or eighteenth century played a role analogous to modern stock certificates. . . 
. Some references suggest that delivery of certificates may not have been the essential aspect of securities 
trading.").  
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Corporation Study called eliminating stock certificates a "utopian solution",
118 and raised an argument 
that was to be repeated often in the decades that followed, i.e., that shareholders have a psychological 
aversion to giving up their paper.
119  At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities, the NYSE's 
Central Certificate Service was already in operation, and was based on nothing more high tech than a 
bank's vault and fiduciary duties.  Because it meant placing the bulk of the economy's securities in the 
possession and name of a body owned by the financial market participants, and then trading claims 
against the accounts of such body, it required amendment of commercial law – i.e., Article 8 UCC – 
rather  than  corporate  law,  amendments  that  BASIC  promised  to  procure.
120   It  should  be  noted, 
however, that even BASIC saw the indirect holding system as a "temporary" measure on the way to 
what  was  somewhat  futuristically  called  the  "certificateless  society".
121  As  the  SEC  Report 
summarizes: 
The many points of difficulty in the delivery and transfer process manifestly call for 
attack on various fronts: the expansion of facilities, the removal of artificial stumbling 
blocks;  the  modernization  of  those  processes  through  the  improvement  of  clearance 
procedures,  the  immobilization  of  the  certificate  through  the  advancement  of  the 
development  of  depositories,  such  as  the  NYSE  Central  Certificate  Service,  the 




(b) Immobilization is Imposed by Law 
The  idea  of  a  decentralized  network  of  registers  on  which  shares  would  be  transparently 
transferred appears to have been considered less and less realistic just as progress in technology made 
it  a  more  and  more  possible.    Probably  the  most  significant  reason  for  the  market  forgetting  it, 
however,  was  that  immobilization  was  imposed  by  law.    Congress,  in  the  1975  Securities  Acts 
Amendments, took the extremely unusual step of legally imposing a single technique for settlement on 
the markets.  The effect on securities settlement was somewhat comparable the effects of a law that 
would require all computers plugged into the internet to run on DOS.  As amended, § 17A Exchange 
Act requires the SEC to "use its authority . . . to end the physical movement of securities certificates in 
connection with the settlement among brokers and dealers of transactions in securities . . .",
123 i.e., to 
impose the immobilization of securities certificates in a depository.  In this way, what was considered 
                                                       
118   SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 194. 
119   See Id. at 194 et seq. 
120   See Id. at 188.  
121   See Id. at 186. 
122   Id.  at  168,  203  ("...  the  ultimate  objectives  of  the  certificateless  society  and  the  standardization  of 
documents used in the clearing, settlement and delivery process"). 
123   15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2000).  
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an  "interim  step"  on  the  way  to  the  "certificateless  society"  became  the  permanent  basis  of  U.S. 
securities  settlement.    Given  the  SEC's  role  as  an  independent  regulatory  agency  expert  in  the 
technicalities of the securities market, the choice of Congress to regulate down into the details and 
impose a system that was generally considered a short-term, second-best solution is curious. 
In his history of this period, Chris Welles speaks of strong interests in New York seeking to 
save  the  struggling  city's  viability  as  the  country's  financial  center  and  the  role  of  the  central 
depository in this struggle.
124  The elimination of fixed commissions dealt a very strong blow to the 
club-like security of the New York financial community.  Suddenly income that had been stable and 
certain since the 18
th Century was thrown open to unfettered competition.
125  Moreover, the launch of 
the decentralized NASDAQ system, referred to on Wall Street as "the machine", had destroyed the 
New  York  monopoly  over  the  OTC  market  in  a  single  day.
126   A  depository  entity  that  would 
concentrate the nation's securities  in  New  York  under  the  control  of  the  NYSE  and  its members 
presented a certain bulwark against this strong, centrifugal tendency.
127  In addition, some New York 
banks apparently hoped to translate the depository into direct competitive advantage.  Welles reports 
that  until  1971,  rules  of  the  CCS  allowed  the  securities  held  in  the  depository  to  be  transferred 
exclusively to New York banks as security for loans, thus giving these banks exclusive access high 
quality  collateral  from  borrowing  brokers.
128    This  rule  remained  in  force  until  the  First  of 
Pennsylvania  Bank  and  Trust  Company  threatened  to  file  an  antitrust  complaint  with  the  Justice 
Department.
129  Even if not rising to the level of such exclusive use, the concentration of the nation's 
outstanding securities in the hands of an entity controlled by the NYSE and its members presented 
obvious advantages for the NYSE, which in its long history has never been shy about making its 
influence felt in government.
130 
Aside from these tangible, economic interests, there are other reasons that might explain why in 
1975  Congress  ordered  the  imposition  of  a  100  year  old  technique  to  the  exclusion  of  the  more 
                                                       
124   See WELLES, supra note 60, at Chapter. 8, "The Fight over the New Marketplace". 
125   Id. at 121. 
126   Id. at 285 et seq. 
127   Id. at 317. 
128   Id. at 318. 
129  Id. at 318.  
130   Prof.  Stuart  Banner  describes  how  beginning  in  the  1830's  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  and  Board 
(predecessor of the NYSE) repeatedly took action to ward off proposed measures in the legislature of the 
State of New York to regulate its activity. See  STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, p. 267 et seq. (1998).  Prof. Joel Seligman describes nearly 70 
years of a delicate triangle in which the SEC supervises the NYSE, but the latter attempts to go over its 
head by applying pressure in the federal government. See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54.   
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favored,  modern  model.    Professor  Roberta  Romano  has  formulated  something  like  a  variant  of 
Schumpeter's "innovative entrepreneur"
131 in connection with the development of securities law by 
asserting that "policy entrepreneurs"
132 foisted second-best solutions on a panicked Congress to create 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
133  Romano's argument might be summarized for our purposes as that 
Congressional mood focused on media image rather than rational choice, which opened the door to 
enterprising lobbyists, giving weak ideas stronger positions than they deserved. If the United States 
was in panic in 2002, it was certainly in a state approaching traumatic depression in 1975.
134  Since 
1973, the U.S. had been struggling with the OPEC induced oil shock and the inflation that followed, 
the office of the U.S. presidency had reached its nadir in 1974 when Richard Nixon resigned his office 
in scandal, U.S. forces made their final withdrawal from the Vietnam disaster in April of 1975, and in 
November of that year with New York City approaching insolvency, the State of New York declared 
that it would suspend payments on $ 1.6 billion of its short-term debt.
135  The mood at this time was 
very far from the limitless trust in technology of 1969, when Apollo 11 had landed on the moon and 
the computerized NASDAQ project had been set in motion.  Under such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that Congress selected a safe, low-tech solution that shut out any future risk.
136  Moreover, 
one  could  imagine  a  certain  amount  of  horse  trading  in  the  1975  bill.    The  elimination  of  fixed 
commissions and the opening of the NYSE to competition with regional exchanges was by far the 
most important thrust of the amendments.  If an obscure provision on "back-office" technicalities 
threw a bone to the New York market, this could only have served to demonstrate that Congress was 
fair, and not out to damage an already suffering New York City.  Nevertheless, legislating specific 
technological models is very unusual given the rapid rate of technological change and that the role of 
the SEC is exactly to address the details; §17A(e) Exchange Act made certain that the technique of 
immobilization was in the market to stay. 
                                                       
131   See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THEORIE DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 184 et seq. (reprint of original 
1912 ed., 2006) 
132   Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. 
J. 1521, 1591 (2004). 
133   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
134   LOSS OF CONFIDENCE: POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE 1970'S (Brian David Robertson, ed. 1998), available at 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14450900. 
135   For a discussion of the New York debt crisis, see RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN 
BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 619 et seq. (1990). 
136   There is also the bounded rationality often found in legislation that focuses on one problem while creating 
others,  such  as  the  diminution  of  enforcement  actions  following  enactment  of  the  Private  Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1994). Commentators have pointed out that it 
increased  the  difficulty  of  actions  against  securities  fraud  just  when  such  fraud  was  ready  to  increase 
dramatically.  See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of 
the 1990's, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 288 et seq. (2004).  
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(c)  The SEC's 1976 Street Name Study 
Although the 1975 Act did instruct the SEC to investigate the effects of immobilization on 
shareholder communications, the wording of the mandate precluded any serious consideration of an 
alternative settlement model.  Congress instructed the SEC to investigate whether: 
a)  registration of shares in the name of financial institutions ('street names') is consistent with the 
policies of the Exchange Act, and if consistent 
b)  steps could be taken to facilitate communications between corporations and their shareholders 
while at the same time retaining the benefits of 'street name' registration.
137 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  majority  of  participants  at  the  1971  conference  preferred  a 
decentralized system in which uncertificated securities would be traded, although they agreed that the 
type of feigned dematerializations that depositories could achieve through immobilizing securities in 
their vaults was necessary as an interim measure.  This wavering between two solutions is no longer 
present in Congress' instruction.  The SEC was not instructed to find the best model for a national 
system  of  clearing  and  settlement,  but  rather  to  investigate  whether  the  immobilization  imposed 
through § 17A could coexist with the registration and proxy requirements of the Exchange Act, and 
whether the negative effects of immobilization on shareholder communications could be ameliorated 
without losing the benefits of such immobiliatzion for the settlement process.  As a result, although the 
SEC's Study reported that street name registration "makes communications between issuers and their 
shareholders more circuitous,"
138 slower
139 and "substantially" more expensive,
140 it had to conclude 
together with market participants that the street name system was better than the system that collapsed 
in the late 1960's.
141  When compared to a manner of operations that led to the disappearance of over 
100  brokerage  firms,  it  was  difficult  for  the  SEC  to  conclude  otherwise  than  that  the  system  of 
immobilization was "functioning reasonably well"
142 and consistent with the Exchange Act.
143  Then 
the Commission honestly summed up this finding in an open tautology: "The Commission believes 
that the practice of registering securities in other than the name of the beneficial owner is … consistent 
                                                       
137   SEC STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 108, at 2; S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 237 (1975) (emphasis added); LOSS 
& SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6. 
138   Id. at  2. 
139   Id. at  17,  
140   Id. at  25, 26 et seq., 35. 
141   Id. at 5, 37. Following the paper crunch and its aftermath, only 7.8 % of the shareholders responding to SEC 
inquiries complained about the new, indirect holding system. Id. at 28.  
142   Id. at 42. 
143   Id. at 3, 52.  
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with the purposes of the Act, with particular reference to Section 17A,"
144 which is of course the 
provision that ordered such immobilization be imposed in the first place.  Far from referring to the 
insertion  of  intermediaries  between  shareholders  and  issuers  as  a  temporary,  necessary  evil,  the 
Commission referred to this process as "the foundation of a national system for the clearance and 
settlement  of  securities  transactions,  and  is  dependent  upon  the  registration  of  securities  in  the 
nominee of the depository."
145 
With regard to the second half of its investigative mandate – whether steps could be taken to 
facilitate communications despite the indirect relationship – the SEC again acknowledged that most 
market  participants  would  prefer  a  system  that  allowed  direct  communications,  and  that  a 
decentralized  network  in  which  uncertificated  shares  would  be  traded  electronically  was  often 
recommended.
146  This shows that the market had not abandoned the TAD idea between the 1971 
conference and the 1976 investigation.  However, although U.S. government securities would soon be 
traded  electronically  solely  in  uncertificated  form,  as  they  had  been  in  Germany  for  years,  and 
although France would soon dematerialize its market completely with a single law,
147 the SEC again 
concluded that dematerialization was not a practical solution,
148 even if it appeared "to exhibit promise 
as a long-term means for streamlining shareholder communications."
149  The sentence just quoted 
referring to dematerialization as having "long-term" promise for the communications problem did not 
make it into the conclusions of the SEC's Report.  Indeed, these conclusions expressed a frustrating, 
albeit common, division often found in large organizations, one that in coming decades would place 
the Division of Corporate Finance, which sought to improve shareholder communications, directly at 
odds  with  the  Division  of  Market  Regulation,  which  wanted  to  increase  settlement  speed  and 
efficiency.  As the SEC concluded:  
The TAD [Transfer Agent Depository] concept exhibits promise as an important long-
term alternative. It is not, however, a system for streamlining communications but rather 
an approach to a national clearance and settlement system which, as a by-product, would 
improve issuer-shareholder communications. Development of TAD, therefore, must be 
integrated with other developments in clearance and settlement.
150 
                                                       
144   Id. at 10. 
145   Id. at 9-10. 
146   Id. at 30, 42. 
147   Hubert de Vauplane, Bilan du système français de dématérialisation, in 20 ANS DE DÉMATÉRIALISATION DES 
TITRES  EN  FRANCE:  BILAN  ET  PERSPECTIVES  NATIONALES  ET  INTERNATIONALES  85  et  seq.  (Hubert  de 
Vauplane, ed. 2005). 
148   SEC STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 108, at 4, 42. 
149   Id. at 4. 
150   Id. at 43.  
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As a result, the indirect holding system – originally thought an interim measure – increasingly became 
seen as an indispensible structure around which proxy laws and the UCC needed to be bent and 
twisted.  By the time information technology made a direct, decentralized system wholly realizable, 
the option was more or less excluded by the SEC and major market participants.  The Corporate 
Finance Division could not study a direct system as a means to improve communications because it 
was primarily a clearing and settlement model, falling under the auspices of the Division of Market 
Regulation.  The latter Division had no reason to push for such a system because immobilization is the 
"foundation" of clearing and settlement and the primary advantage of a TAD is to offer a direct and 
transparent  relationship  between  shareholders  and  issuers,  which  is  a  matter  that  falls  under  the 
responsibilities of the Division of Corporate Finance.  In this way, a direct registration system fell 
through the gaps in regulatory competence for roughly 20 years until reappearing in 1994 as a project 
pushed by issuers and transfer agents, as will be discussed in Part IV.  In the mean time, however, the 
indirect holding system has taken on the look of serene permanence that is lent to walls when they 
become covered by a network of ivy vines, only in this case the vines consist of labyrinthine rules for 
proxy distribution and a redesigned Article 8, UCC.  Indeed, when the SEC looked at this area from 
the  communications  side  in  1982
151 and  from  the  settlement  safety  side  in  1992,
152 the  idea  of  a 
structural change to avoid disrupting direct registration was no longer raised. Part III will describe the 
rules for indirect communications through a chain of intermediaries. 
III. COMMUNICATING THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES 
1.  The Contents of Today's Stockholder List 
Under state corporation law, a shareholder is defined as someone who is registered on the 
stockholders list,
153 not a person who has title to shares, and under the UCC an issuer has the right to 
                                                       
151   U.S.  SECURITIES  AND  EXCHANGE  COMMISSION,  IMPROVING  COMMUNICATIONS  BETWEEN  ISSUERS  AND 
BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF NOMINEE HELD SECURITIES (June 1982) (recommending amendment of existing 
rules to allow access to lists of names of shareholders). 
152   REPORT OF THE BACHMANN TASK FORCE ON CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM IN U.S. SECURITIES 
MARKETS, SUBMITTED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S.  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 25 (May 
1992) ("The Task Force believes that . . . immobilization should be the preferred route for U.S. corporate 
and municipal securities . . ."). 
153   See e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §219(c); Williams v. Sterling Oil of Oklahoma, Inc., 267 A.2d 630, 634 
(Del. Ch. 1970); RODMAN WARD JR., EDWARD P. WELSCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 219.4 (2002); JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, 
CORPORATIONS §13.18 (2002); GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 1:5, p. 1-15, § 2.2, p. 2-7; Estate of Bridges v. 
Mosebrook, 662 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1983); Johnson v. Johnson, 764 S.W.2d 711, 715 
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1989).  
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deal solely with the registered shareholder.
154  As explained in Part I, the transfer of a registered 
security requires no more than a voluntary intent to transfer and an actual delivery, even though only 
the persons registered on the stockholders list have the right to vote the shares or receive dividends.
155  
As explained in Part II, in order to streamline securities settlement, Congress ordered that shares 
traded  on  exchanges  be  immobilized,  which  obviates  both  physical  delivery  of  certificates  and 
registration of transfer because the shares usually remain registered in the name of a depository or its 
nominee.  This process creates a discrepancy between ownership of the share (economic or beneficial 
ownership) and the legal status as shareholder (registered stockholder).
156 The more of a market's 
securities that are registered in the name of a central depository, the greater the number of transactions 
that can be carried out on its books.  The ultimate goal in this model is for all issuers to cede control 
over all shareholder data to a single entity, which would then conduct all of the market's transactions 
on its books, just as if all securities in circulation on the market had been dematerialized.  Today, in 
fact, it is likely that a listed company will have only one registered shareholder, appropriately named 
"Cede & Company", the nominee of the Depository Trust Company (DTC), which is a subsidiary of 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Company (DTCC), the entity whose group clears and settles almost 
all securities transactions entered into on organized markets in the United States. The rules of DTC 
require that Cede be registered as holder for all deposited securities.
157   
This drastically reduces paperwork and makes it possible for DTCC to settle enormous numbers 
of transactions with great efficiency,
158 but also effectively eliminates the stockholders list, which is 
supposed  to  play  an  important  role  under  corporate  law  in  communication  with  and  between 
shareholders.  The names, addresses and holding positions of shareholders are supposed to be used to 
send shareholders invitations to annual meetings and determine who may vote and receive dividends.  
They should also be available to shareholders to enable them to contact their fellow shareholders 
                                                       
154   U.C.C. §8-207(a) (2005). It should be noted, however, that this rule does not place formal registration 
above a reasonable analysis of the circumstances. If a buyer demonstrates to the company that she has 
purchased the a share from the registered owner, this will be sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of 
the registered owner. See U.C.C. §8-207(a), Off. Comm. No. 2 (2005). 
155   Because trading continues after the record date on which stockholders lists are prepared, exchange rules 
often provide contractual duties between the seller and the buyer of shares to transfer accrued rights in the 
case  of  a  sale  after  the  record  date  but  before  the  right  is  exercised.    See  NYSE  Rules,  Rule  235  in 
connection  with  Rules  237  and  259,  and  NASD  Manual,  Sec.  11140,  Transactions  in  Securities  "Ex-
Dividend," "Ex-Rights" or "Ex-Warrants", in connection with Sec. 11630 "Due-Bills and Due-Bill Checks", 
available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd (hereinafter "NASD Manual"). 
156   See Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities: State and Federal Interaction 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 451 et 
seq. (1990). 
157   Rules, By-laws and Organization Certificate of the Depository Trust Company (version of March 2007) 
(hereinafter "DTC Rules"), Rule 6. 
158   S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 183 (1975).  
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directly.
159   Because  under  § 14(d)  Exchange  Act  the  SEC  is  charged  with  regulating  the  proxy 
process,  the  imposition  of  immobilization  also  challenged  it  to  find  ways  that  issuers  could 
communicate with shareholders despite the fact that stockholder lists no longer provided the requisite 
information.  A direct registration system, which will be discussed in Part IV, could potentially change 
this situation, although it has been tightly incorporated into the DTCC system in a way that could 
eliminate its usefulness for communications.  In this Part, we will review the complex rules that were 
designed to allow communication with shareholders to take place through the chain of brokers, banks 
and depositories comprising the "indirect holding system." 
2. The Shareholder Communication Rules 
All  concerned  parties  knew  that  immobilization  would  seriously  disrupt  shareholder 
communications.
160  Indeed, before Congress adopted the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, the SEC 
had drafted a rule that would have required intermediaries to disclose shareholder information to 
issuers.
161  Following approval of the Act, the SEC then discussed broadening the applicability of the 
disclosure  rules  adopted  under  § 13(d)  Exchange  Act  in  order  to  provide  information  regarding 
shareholders other than those with large holdings who intended to influence management.
162  Neither 
of these paths was ultimately followed.  Rather, beginning in 1974, the SEC began to build on the 
common law principles expressed in such cases as Walsh and Levine v. Peoria and Eastern Railway 
Company,
163 which required issuers, when sending out proxy materials, to inquire beyond the wall of 
intermediaries they found in the stockholders list and request that these intermediaries forward the 
documents along to their clients. 
The first rule that was adopted, Rule 14a3-(d) (now Rule 14a-13),
164 requires issuers whose 
stockholders list contains the name of a clearing agency to ask the latter for a list of the agency 
participant entities that hold the issuer's shares.
165  The issuer must then ask the entities named by the 
clearing agency, together with any intermediaries directly entered in the shareholders register, whether 
they hold stock for clients, and if so, to specify the number of proxy material packages required for 
                                                       
159   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §220. 
160   S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 237 et seq. (1975). 
161   RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL §8.02[B] (3rd ed. 1998, Supp. 2001). 
162   SEC STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 108, at 6, 52.  
163   Walsh & Levine v. Peoria & Eastern Railway Co., 222 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
164   Originally adopted with Exchange Act Release Nr. 11,079, 39 Fed. Reg. 40766 (Oct. 31, 1974), and now 
codified at 17 CFR § 240.14a-13. See also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6. 
165   17 CFR § 240.14a-13, Note 1.  
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such clients.
166  The issuer must then provide the specified quantity of materials to the intermediaries 
or their agents and reimburse them for the distribution.
167  This issuer duty originally piggybacked on 
existing duties of exchange members to provide information regarding required quantities of proxy 
materials and to forward such materials to their clients, but left a gap where no such duty existed, such 
as for issues traded on the OTC markets.
168  After about three years, the Commission filled this gap by 
adopting Rule 14b-1.
169  This rule requires brokers to inform issuers of the number of proxy material 
packages necessary for their clients and – upon receiving assurance of reimbursement – to forward the 
packages to such clients.
170  Another, perhaps more well known provision of this rule appears to create 
the  disclosure  that  would  enable  direct  communications,  but  really  does  not.    In  1983  the  SEC 
amended Rules 14a-13 and 14b-1 to give issuers a right to ask brokers to provide them with a list of 
those client-shareholders who did not objected to their identities being disclosed to the issuer ("Non-
Objecting  Beneficial  Owners,"  or  "NOBOS").
171   This  would  seem  to  have  solved  much  of  the 
communications problem except for the significant catch that the NOBO list may be used solely for 
the limited purpose of sending the annual report or "voluntary" communications,
172 but not the proxy 
materials, which still must be distributed indirectly through the intermediaries, although nothing but 
cost would prevent an issuer from sending an identical second copy of proxy materials directly to the 
names on the list.
173  The late Professor Louis Loss and Dean Joel Seligman rightly criticize this 
limitation as a missed opportunity to support direct communications.
174   Perhaps what holds the SEC 
back from allowing direct dispatch of proxy cards is that the recipients (beneficial shareholders) would 
in any case not be shareholders under corporate law, and thus could not cast votes without receiving a 
proxy from the registered shareholder – the intermediary.
175  The same difficulty reappears in the 2007 
                                                       
166   17 CFR § 240.14a-13(a)(1). 
167   17 CFR § 240.14a-13(a)(4)-(5). 
168   THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 161, at §8.02[B], footnote 78. 
169   Originally adopted by the SEC Release, Final Rule: Requirements for Dissemination of Proxy Information 
to Beneficial Owners by Issuers and Intermediary Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 13,719, 42 
Fed. Reg. 35953 (July 5, 1977), now codified at 17 CFR § 240.14b-1. 
170   17 CFR § 240.14b-1(b). 
171   Originally adopted by the SEC Release, Final Rules: Facilitating Shareholder Communications Provisions, 
Exchange  Act  Release  No.  34-20021,  48  Fed.  Reg.  35082  (Aug.  3,  1983),  now  codified  at  17  CFR 
§ 240.14b-1(b)(3)(i) in connection with § 240.14a-13(b)-(c). 
172   17 CFR § 240.14a-13(c).  
173   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at , § 2:2, p. 2-8 et seq.   
174   LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6. 
175   Some  might  object  to  the  weight  that  is  here  placed  on  registered  shareholders  by  pointing  to  § 7.23 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, which allows corporations to "establish a procedure by which the 
beneficial owner of shares that are registered in the name of a nominee is recognized by the corporation as  
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Rule  on  the  Internet  Availability  of  Proxy  Materials,
176 pursuant  to  which  the  proxy  materials 
themselves may be posted on a website, but a Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials must 
be send indirectly through the record holding intermediaries.
177  This Rule reveals the SEC's regretful 
gravitation toward a system of anonymous communication, and will be discussed in Section 5 of this 
Part III. 
Another problem with the distribution of proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14b-1 is of course 
that not only brokers, but also banks, hold shares in custody for clients.  Because the SEC does not 
have primary jurisdiction over banks, they were not covered by Rule 14b-1.  To fill this gap in the 
communications chain, Congress enacted the Shareholder Communications Act of 1985, which gave 
the SEC authority to adopt a rule like 14b-1 that would apply to banks.
178  As a consequence, the 
Commission in 1986 adopted Rule 14b-2, which is closely modeled on the twin rule for brokers, with 
a single exception.
179  Rule 14b-2 not only requires information on numbers of necessary packages, the 
forwarding of such packages, and the generation and delivery of NOBO lists, but it also requires banks 
to  reveal  any  respondent  banks  for  which  they  hold  shares  and  imposes  similar  duties  on  such 
respondent  banks.
180    This  allows  issuers  to  follow  the  chain  of  intermediaries  from  a  large 
international bank that belongs to DTC to the regional banks with which the beneficial shareholder has 
her direct account relationship.  Oddly, a like duty was never added to Rule 14b-1 to allow issuers to 
look for further intermediaries beyond the large clearing brokers.
181   
Issuers,  brokers  and  banks  can  and  do  unload  most  of  their  complex  inquiry  and  dispatch 
activity  under  these  rules  on  companies  like  Automatic  Data  Processing  (ADP)  that  entered  the 
shareholder communications business in the 1980's to profit from issuers and intermediaries that did 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the  shareholder."  However,  the  only  way  that  this  could  be  done  would  be  through  the  registered 
shareholder.  Thus, (1) the nominee would have to prove it was the registered holder and (2) the beneficiary 
would have to prove that he enjoyed a contractual or property right to benefit from the nominee's holding.  
Such provisions do not eliminate the necessity of registration, but actually add to it the necessity of being 
registered in the account of the intermediary. 
176   Final Rule: Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34–55146, 72 Fed. Reg. 
4148 (Jan. 29, 2007). (hereinafter "Internet Publication Rule"). 
177   17 CFR §240.14a-16(a)(2); §240.14b-1(d); §240.14b-2(d) . 
178   The Shareholders' Communication Act of 1985, P.L. 99-222, 99 Stat. 1737, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78n. 
179   Final Rules: Shareholder Communication Facilitation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23847, 51 Fed. Reg. 
44267 (Dec. 9, 1986). 
180   17  CFR  § 240.14b-2(b)(1)(i).    Another  difference  that  is  perhaps  still  worthy  of  note  is  that  for  trust 
accounts opened on or before December 28, 1986, clients must give affirmative consent (as opposed to not 
objecting) in order that their names be disclosed to the issuer. See 17 CFR §240.14b-2(b)(1)(ii)(B)(1). 
181   See Shaun M. Klein, Rule 14b-2: Does It Actually Lean to the Prompt Forwarding of Communications to 
Beneficial Owners of Securities? 23 J. Corp. L. 155, 169 (1997).  
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not wish to perform this extremely cumbersome process themselves.
182  ADP spun off its shareholder 
communication activities to Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. on March 30, 2007.
183  It should be 
stressed that the quick move of the private sector to fill gaps and take up slack created by less than 
optimal regulation is no argument for the acceptability of this process, which is regularly singled out 
as overly complex and expensive.
184 
The process of shareholder communications foreseen by the corporation laws of the 50 states is 
quite clear: Step 1, look in the stockholders list for names and addresses; Step 2, send the materials to 
those persons at those addresses.  For illustrative purposes, the following section briefly sets out the 
steps to be taken in the current inquiry and forwarding process under Rules 14a-13, 14a-16, 14b-1 and 
14b-2.  Figure A provides a graphic depiction of this process.   
                                                       
182   For a description of ADP's activities, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC 
AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION §18:13 (updated to 2005). In its annual report for 2006, the last year before 
ADP  spun  off  its  proxy  services  to  Broadridge,  ADP  announced  that  it:  "Served  the  investor 
communications needs of approximately 13,000 U.S. publicly traded corporations and 450 mutual funds 
and annuity companies, on behalf of more than 850 brokerage firms and banks. > Distributed nearly 1.1 
billion pieces of investor communications materials. . . , including proxy ballots covering more than 565 
billion  shares  [and]  >  Delivered  nearly  50  million  investor  communications  via  the  Internet  .  .  .  ." 
Automatic  Data  Processing,  Focus  on  Growth:  2006  Summary  Annual  Report  (2007),  available  at 
http://www.investquest.com/iq/a/adp/fin/annual/index.htm. 
183   See Form 10-K of Automatic Data Processing, Inc. for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007, available at 
www.sec.gov. 
184   See  J.  Robert  Brown,  The  Shareholder  Communication  Rules  and  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility? 13 J. CORP. L. 683, 758 (1988); Klein, supra 
note 181, at 175 et seq.; LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at §6-C-6;  The Business Roundtable, Request 
for Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, SEC File no. 4-493 (April 12, 2004).  
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Figure A
Distribution of Proxy Materials through the Chain of Intermediaries
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3. Distributing Proxies and Voting through Intermediaries 
The  main  characteristics  of  this  communication  process  are  first  that  the  issuer  plays 
blindfolded, and cannot know what lies beyond the next wall in the intermediary pyramid before 
making an inquiry – thus inquiry always precedes communication – and second that the power to cast 
votes under corporate law (which belong to the registered shareholder) is split off from the power to 
cast  votes  under  property,  contract,  or  federal  securities  law  (which  belong  to  the  beneficial 
shareholder).   
(a)  Distribution of the Proxy Materials 
Step One: The stockholders list may well contain one name, "Cede & Co.", the nominee of a 
clearing agency, so Rule 14a-13 requires that the issuer contact DTC at least 20 business days prior to 
the record date of the shareholders' meeting to request a securities position listing specifying the 
names of its participant firms that hold the issuer's stock for beneficiaries (often referred to as a "Cede 
breakdown").
185  
Step Two: DTC must promptly furnish the securities position listing to the requesting issuer and 
collect a fee designed to recover the reasonable costs of providing the listing.
186  
Step Three: Still within the timeframe of 20 business days before the record date, ask the banks 
and brokers on the position listing whether they hold for beneficial owners and if so, the number of 
copies of the proxy materials necessary for supplying such beneficial owners, as well as whether any 
banks on the listing hold for respondent a bank.
187  
Step  Four:  Banks  must  within  one  business  day  provide  the  name  and  addresses  of  each 
respondent bank that holds the issuer's securities for beneficial owners.
188 Both banks and brokers 
must within seven business days provide the number of their customers who need proxy materials and, 
if requested, a NOBO list for the issuer to distribute the annual report.
189  
Step Five: Within one business day of receiving the name and address of a respondent bank, ask 
such  bank  for  information  as  in  Step  Three.
190 Respondent  banks  must  then  follow  Step  Four, 
providing  further  respondent  banks  and  numbers  of  beneficial  owner  customers.    Upon  receiving 
information from brokers, banks and respondent banks on the number of proxy materials necessary, 
                                                       
185   17 CFR § 240.14a–13(a)(3)(i) and Note 1. 
186   17 CFR § 240.17Ad–8(b). 
187   17 CFR § 240.14a–13(a)(1)(i). 
188   17 CFR § 240.14b–2(b)(1)(i). 
189   17 CFR § 240.14b–1(b)(1) applies to brokers and 17 CFR § 240.14b–2(b)(1)(ii) applies to banks. See 
Brown, supra note 184, at 740 et seq. 
190   17 CFR § 240.14a–13(a)(2).  
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the issuer must supply, in a timely manner,
191 each of them with copies of the proxy materials in the 
quantities and at the place(s) named.
192  If the issuer intends to make the proxy materials available by 
internet, it must also provide the brokers and banks with the information necessary to prepare and send 
out  a  "Notice  of  Internet  Availability  of  Proxy  Materials"  at  least  40  calendar  days  before  the 
shareholders' meeting.
193 
Step Six: Because only registered shareholders are entitled to vote shares, registered holders 
must execute proxies in favor of the next entity or person in the chain or collect instructions from them 
for their own vote.  Rule 14b-2 expressly requires that banks provide their respondent banks with 
"omnibus proxies" so that they can exercise the voting rights of the shares in question.
194  Although 
Rule  14b-1  does  not  contain  a  corresponding  provision  for  brokers,  stock  exchange  rules  would 
normally require a broker to issue a proxy or request voting instructions when forwarding the proxy 
materials to a customer,
195and unless they do so, they are not able to exercise "broker votes"
196 in the 
absence of receiving an answer from their customers.
197  The depository contract with DTC would 
provide that it issue its participants a proxy covering all shares held in a custody account with DTC at 
any given time (referred to as an "omnibus proxy").
198 
Step Seven: Provided they are paid a fee to cover reasonable costs,
199 the intermediaries must 
now distribute the materials within five days of receipt to their beneficial owner customers.
200 
Step Eight: the customers of a clearing brokerage may very likely be retail brokers who in turn 
hold shares for customers.  Even though Rule 14b-1 does not require inquiry down the entire chain to 
                                                       
191   The SEC has defined "timely manner" in this case to mean: "mailed sufficiently in advance of the meeting 
date to allow five business days for processing by the banks and brokers and an additional time to provide 
ample time for delivery of the material, consideration of the material by the beneficial owners, return of 
their voting instructions, and transmittal of the vote from the bank or broker to the tabulator." Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Timely Distribution of Proxy and Other Soliciting Material, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-33768, 59 Fed. Reg. (March 22, 1994). 
192   17 CFR § 240.14a–13(a)(4). 
193   17 CFR § 240.14a–16(a). 
194   See 17 CFR §240.14b-2(b)(2)(i). 
195   See e.g., NYSE Rules, Rule 451(b)(2). 
196   See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, "The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on 
Shareholder Voting," University of Delaware Working Paper No. 2002-002, Oct. 2002, p.2, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354820; THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 161, at § 8.03[D]. 
197   See e.g., NYSE Rules, Rule 450; NASD Manual, Sec. 2260, as well as THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 161, 
at § 8.03[D]; Brown, supra note 184, at 704, and Klein, supra note 181, at 162. 
198   THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 161, at §8.02[A]; Brown supra note 184, at 753. 
199   17 CFR § 240.14b–1(c)(2)(i) applies to brokers, and 17 CFR § 240.14b–2(c)(2)(i) applies to banks. 
200   17 CFR § 240.14b–1(b)(2) applies to brokers, and 17 CFR § 240.14b–2(b)(3) applies to banks.  
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the retail customer, contractual duties would likely require further distribution of the proxy materials 
to the beneficial owner of the stock.  In the case of a bank, this step would be required by Rule 14b-2. 
(b) Casting Votes 
The last three steps in Figure A show the casting of votes. Since only shareholders of record can 
vote,
201 and in our example Cede & Co. is the only shareholder of record, it is necessary for Cede & 
Co. to give its participants an "omnibus proxy", and that they issue further proxies to their customers 
or request voting instructions. In our example, a retail investor is casting a vote, but in the case of a 
mutual  fund,  the  fund  manager  would  likely  have  power  to  vote  under  the  investment  adviser 
contract,
202 which as there would be a further split between beneficial ownership in the fund and 
voting discretion in the manager would add another level of complexity to the process.  If a broker 
provides its customer with the proxy materials and a signed proxy or a request for voting instructions 
within 15 days before the shareholders' meeting, and the customer fails to respond within 10 days 
before the meeting, a broker itself may vote the shares freely on all matters that are not "contested".
203 
NYSE Rule 252 contains a list of the matters that are contested, which includes proxy contests and 
such actions as mergers, extraordinary transactions, and changes to the capital structure, but not the 
election of directors or the approval of a shareholder proposal.
204  When voting with free discretion on 
uncontested  matters,  brokers  tend  to  support  management.
205  Repeated  efforts  by  institutional 
investors to eliminate "broker votes" have to date not been successful.
206 
The last steps on Figure A thus proceed as follows: 
Step Nine: Together with the proxy statement and the annual report (if not sent directly through 
a NOBO list), the beneficial owner will receive a signed proxy card to be filled out or a request for 
voting instructions. She will then cast her vote and return the completed forms either to the proxy 
                                                       
201   See e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 213(a) and §219(c). 
202   Amit Goyal & Sunil Wahal, "The Selection and Termination of Investment Managers by Plan Sponsors," 
November 2004, p. 2 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=675970; Nell Minow, Institutional Investors: 
New Tactics and Old Duties, p. 107 Practicing Law Institute (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Taking Stock: 
Reflections on Sixty Years of Securities Regulation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 861 (1994); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: the Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 
1310 (1991).  
203   NYSE Rules, Rule 452. 
204   NYSE Rules, Rule 452, Supplementary Material, .11.  
205   Bethel & Gillan, supra note 196, at 9.  
206   Id. at 30.   
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service acting for the broker, her broker, or the company. If the issuer is listed on the NYSE, she may 
also refrain from responding, which will trigger a broker vote in favor of the broker.
207 
Step Ten: If the materials are returned to the broker, it must tabulate the voting instructions or 
gather the proxies and return them to the proxy service acting for the broker, the clearing broker, or the 
company. If no proxy or instructions are received within 10 days of the meeting, and the broker is a 
member of the NYSE, it may cast a broker vote on uncontested matters. 
Step Eleven: Either the proxy service handling the voting process or the clearing broker will 
tabulate any instructions and forward them together with any completed proxy cards not sent directly 
to the meeting. All costs for each step of this process, including the fees of a proxy service, are borne 
by the issuer, and thus indirectly by the shareholders.
208 
As mentioned above, this process will likely be handled from start to finish by a proxy service 
of the type that has stepped in since the 1970's to help issuers and intermediaries with this extremely 
cumbersome  process.
209    They  root  out  the  names  of  beneficial  owners,
210  build  lines  of 
communication between intermediaries,
211 and collect proxy cards and tabulate voting instructions.
212  
When an annual meeting is approaching, they – rather than the issuer itself – may well set the process 
in motion.
213  Without such services, the process outlined above would certainly not have been able to 
function.  It is the position of this paper, however, that focusing on the internal operations of such 
services as setting the standard for the process is an incorrect approach.  Recounting the operating 
standards of a service designed to supplement a dysfunctional procedure will not help correct the 
problem.  Section 17A(e) Exchange Act created the indirect holding system, and Rules 14a-13, 14a-
16, 14b-1 and 14b-2 form the regulatory framework by which the process must take place.  The proxy 
                                                       
207   NYSE Rules, Rules 451(b) and 452. Although the rules of the Nasdaq Stock Market do not expressly 
provide  for  broker  votes,  brokers  report  exercising  votes  for  shareholders  of  Nasdaq  listed  companies 
provided  the  practice  is  considered  customary  under  like  circumstances  by  the  rules  of  another  major 
exchange. See Bethel & Gillan, supra note 196, at 7.  
208   THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 161, at §8.03[C]. 
209   For a description of Broadridge's role in this process, see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, "The Hanging 
Chads of Corporate Voting," ILE Research Paper No. 07-18 (August 2007), p. 13 et seq., available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007065.  
210   At least in the past, proxy services could compare information on account movements over a number of 
years with published information on holding levels, deduce the beneficial owners from the correlation and 
then  sell  this  information  to  issuers.  See  JAMES  E.  HEARD  &  HOWARD  D.  SHEARMAN,  CONFLICTS  OF 
INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 84 et seq. (1987). 
211   See the description of proxy services at Georgeson Shareholder, www.georgesonshareholder.com. 
212   Paul Myners reported in 2004 that approximately 90% of U.S. institutional investors cast their vote through 
ADP. PAUL MYNERS, REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES, REPORT TO THE SHAREHOLDER 
VOTING WORKING GROUP 4 (2004). 
213   BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 182, at §18:13.  
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services have placed themselves in this labyrinth with available technology to make it more efficient 
and palatable to all concerned, but the problem and its solution lie with the structure itself, not with the 
services that have made the structure workable. 
4. The Risks and Cost of Communicating through Intermediaries 
Fees sufficient to support an industry of proxy services are not the only costs of communicating 
around and through the indirect holding system.  The negative effects of such communication is much 
higher: votes are lost and miscounted, and information is distorted. Two relatively recent studies of the 
field offer sufficient evidence of this.  
In  2004,  Paul  Myners  prepared  a  study  on  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  in  the  United 
Kingdom.
214  In the 2003 annual meeting of Unilever plc, the high number intermediaries participating 
in  distributing  the  information  on  the  meeting  and  casting  shareholder  votes  led  to  a  significant 
number of the votes not being recorded, i.e., being lost.
215  Evidence presented to the Department of 
Trade and Industry showed that in connection with the Unilever annual meeting records indicated that 
the  10  largest  institutional  investors  had  apparently  cast  less  than  50 %  of  their  votes.    Unilever 
contacted these investors and inquired why they chose not to vote, but the investors' records showed 
that relevant intermediaries never received the voting instructions of three of the investors.
216  Myners 
found  that  the  major  problem  affecting  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  was  the  "large  number  of 
participants through whom information and votes must pass," which is a result of how the securities 
custody and settlement system is set up.
217 As he explains: 
There is little transparency in the process. Where a custodian is appointed, the registered 
or legal owner of the shares (and hence the person recognised by the issuer’s registrar as 
entitled to vote) is normally the custodian’s nominee company. The registrar may well 
not be aware of the identity of the beneficial owner nor will it necessarily know who is 
the person responsible for the voting decision (in many cases the investment manager).
218 
Myners finds that the best way to avoid the problems resulting from opaque layers of intermediaries is 
for  the  shares  to  be  specifically  designated  in  the  name  of  the  person  entitled  to  vote  them.
219  
Specifically designating a part of a global account would do much to reinstitute the direct relationship 
that is broken by immobilization.  As discussed in Part II, the efficiency of immobilization comes from 
                                                       
214   MYNERS, supra note 214. 
215   Id. at 6. 
216   Id. at 1. 
217   Id. at 6. 
218   Id. at 6. For a recent discussion of the complexities of the U.S. voting system, see Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 209, at 13 et seq. 
219   MYNERS, supra note 214, at 16.  
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having  the  shares  in  one  name,  and  thereby  both  avoiding  physical  delivery  of  certificates  and 
registration of transfer.  A specific designation in a larger custody account would thus create some 
additional costs for transfer services, but Myners finds that for at least the largest 200 Pension Funds, 
such  designation  as  the  fund  or  its  manager  as  entitled  to  exercise  voting  rights  would  bring 
"considerable benefits in terms of voting transparency, audit trail and corporate governance for little 
incremental cost."
220 
Another 2004 study, by Oxford Economic Research Associates (Oxera) for DTCC focused on 
"corporate actions", which in the jargon of the clearing and settlement industry are all actions that 
require  communication  between  issuers  and  shareholders,  such  as  rights  issues,  tender  offers, 
conversions, mergers, early redemptions and dividend payments.
221 Oxera found that corporate actions 
involve "a range of intermediaries that operate between the issuer and the final investor. The corporate 
action chain is highly complex, probably because of the way in which it has been formed over time in 
response  to  market  and  institutional  challenges."
222   As  was  explained  in  Part  II,  at  the  time 
immobilization was introduced, limited technology and practical necessity spoke for the creation of a 
complex chain of intermediaries that could affect a kind of faux dematerialization of the market on 
their books.  At the time that Oxera performed its study, a number of markets had been completely 
dematerialized, and this structure was no longer a technological necessity, but the remnants of an 
historical process.  As the previous Section also made clear, the result of this structure is that issuers 
are blindfolded: "most issuers will only have information on the custodian nominees . . . they cannot 
observe directly through the register/agent who the ultimate beneficiary investor is."
223  The result is a 
process in which each member of the chain only sees its next proximate link and no one sees the entire 
process from start to finish.  Someone at position 3 cannot know if the information from position 1 
was altered by passing through position 2.  As Oxera observes, this process gives rise to the following 
operational risks: 
   failure in the processing of a voluntary corporate action (or mandatory corporate action with 
options), such as the exercise of a conversion right; 
   late payment of mandatory corporate actions, such as dividend payments; 
   sub-optimal trading decisions by the front office, arising from corporate action information 
failures, such as an instruction to accept a tender offer being lost or changed; and 
                                                       
220   Id. at 16. 
221   OXFORD ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (OXERA), CORPORATE ACTION PROCESSING: WHAT ARE THE 
RISKS? 4 (2004). 
222   Id. at 8. 
223   Id. at 10.  
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   failure to exercise shareholder rights, which may have an impact on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance.
224 
Such errors can enter the intermediary chain from upstream (as information flows from issuer to 
shareholder) or downstream (as information flows from shareholder to issuer).
225  As the preceding 
section made clear in the case of distributing proxy materials through a chain of banks and respondent 
banks, the more links in the intermediary chain the shorter the period each link will have to perform its 
required duties for a corporate action.
226  Moreover, as we saw with the bifurcated request that must be 
made to banks under Rule 14a-13, asking (i) the number of materials necessary and (ii) information on 
respondent banks, the very number and multiplication of types of intermediaries increases the amount 
of inquires that must be made and the information that must be passed along.  The result of having to 
process more information within shorter deadlines is of course error.
227  Also, once an error enters the 
information flow, it can be passed on and multiplied both in the downstream and in the returning 
upstream information flows.  Oxera extimated in 2004 that failures in processing corporate actions 
could  cost  the  European  asset  management  industry  between  € 90  million  and  € 143  million  per 
year.
228 
The answer from the side of the intermediaries has of course not been to take themselves out of 
the  picture  by  creating  the  kind  of  direct  relationship  between  issuers  and  shareholders  that  was 
preferred but not feasible in 1971, but rather to increase their own services by offering "information 
scrubbing".  Oxera reports in 2004 that intermediaries employ up to 40 persons for the sole purpose of 
"scrubbing" information to reduce errors and increase accuracy.
229  The more sources and types of 
information that are forced through an intermediary, however, the greater the challenge for scrubbing.  
Imagine if the nodes and switches of the internet spine did not simply direct and deliver the emails 
sent in the United States on a given day, but copied them, passed them through a filter that recorded 
them, and then placed them in a different format before passing them on to the recipient.  This image 
can begin to give us an idea of the herculean task that DTCC has to perform.  As DTCC stated in its 
2006 annual report, its "corporate action experts provide 'round-the-clock support, in 16 languages" 
and in 2006 "provided 'scrubbed' information on about 900,000 events from 160 countries."
230  The 
industry generally finds that DTCC performs this task as well as anyone could expect.  The question 
                                                       
224   Id. at 12. 
225   Id. at 12. 
226   Id. at 14. 
227   Id. at 12. 
228   Id. at 29. 
229   Id. at 11, 13 ("These resources represent an inefficiency in the system"). 
230   DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 31 (2007).  
 
Draft of September 18, 2007. © David C. Donald 
 
36  III. COMMUNICATING THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES 
is, however, whether anyone should be performing it at all, given that direct communication would 
make it unnecessary. 
4. Is the SEC Gravitating Towards a Continental European Communication Model? 
Given the costs of communicating through the intermediary chain in terms of time, errors and 
fees, it is not surprising that the SEC has tried to address the problem.  It is also not surprising that 
issuer interest groups such as The Business Roundtable have requested rulemaking to address the high 
costs to issuers.
231  However, the SEC has not moved toward reintroducing direct communications, but 
rather – since immobilization in effect erases the "registered" aspect of shares by registering all shares 
in the name of a single fiduciary – gravitated closer and closer to the type of system of anonymous 
communications  used  in  countries  in  which  shareholders  have  traditionally  been  unknown  to  the 
companies in which they invest.  In Continental Europe, bearer shares are historically common, even if 
during the last decade of the 20
th Century, registered shares became much more popular.  The very 
name of a stock corporation in French – Société Anonyme – makes this clear.  Just as when the capital 
of a company is held by an intermediary, an issuer of bearer shares has no record of its shareholders. 
Because the issuer cannot convene an annual meeting by sending invitations directly to shareholders, 
it provides notice of the meeting through a publicly accessible medium, which was traditionally a 
business newspapers or a type of "federal gazette", and is now more often a website or an electronic 
forum designed for shareholder communications.
232  This type of communication would have been 
much more efficient than randomly asking custodian banks to send invitations to their clients. 
The SEC moved in this direction in 2007 by introducing a type of proxy communication that 
allows proxy materials to be posted on a website for general and anonymous access.
233  The legal 
transplant of a technique designed for bearer shares into a body of corporate law based on registered 
shares of course ran the risk of problems.  To address these, Rule 14a-16 requires that a "Notice of 
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials" be sent to beneficial owners through the intermediary chain 
                                                       
231   See The Business Roundtable, supra note 184. 
232   In  Germany,  where  stock  corporations  traditionally  issue  bearer  shares,  § 124(1)  of  the  German  Stock 
Corporation Act requires the call to annual meeting to be published in designated business newspapers, and 
pursuant to § 25 of this Act, the requirement is satisfied by posting the notice on the electronic version of 
the  Official  Gazette,  which  is  a  designated,  internet  bulletin  board  at 
https://www.ebundesanzeiger.de/research/banzservlet. Pursuant to § 127a of this same Act, a "shareholders' 
forum" (Aktionärsforum) has now been created on the same website for shareholders to post proposals and 
coordinate strategy online before the annual meeting.  It should be noted that § 125(2) of the Act requires 
the  corporation  to  notify  registered  shareholders  (i.e.,  owners  of  registered  shares  entered  in  the 
shareholders' register) directly. 
233   Internet Publication Rule, supra note 176, at codified at 17 CFR §240.14a-16.  
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using  the  same  multistep  process  discussed  above  in  connection  with  paper  materials.
234   As  the 
beneficial owners are not shareholders for purposes of corporate law, the intermediary record holders 
must still provide their customer beneficial owners with proxies or request voting instructions from 
them.
235  Further, even after a beneficial owner has received notice that the materials are available on 
the internet and that he has a right to obtain hard copies of the materials, he may not obtain such 
copies from the issuer, but only from the intermediary.
236  Showing just how deep the logic of the 
indirect holding system dominates communication, the Rule allows respondent banks, whose names 
are not on the stockholders list but have been provided by other banks pursuant to Rule 14b-2, to 
request materials directly from the issuer,
237 but does not grant the same privilege to a beneficial 
shareholder who has released her name on a NOBO list.  She must still communicate with the issuer 
through her broker or bank.  In the same way, not the issuer but the intermediary sends out the Notice 
of Internet Availability to the beneficial owners.
238  The issuer and its shareholders may come into 
immediate contact only through the chaste text of the proxy statement. 
In order to make the posting of materials more efficient, the next logical step would be to 
change over to bearer shares, so the corporate law logic of registered shareholders would no longer 
collide with the efficiency of the indirect holding system.  However, the lobbying for this move would 
bring us back to the problem faced in 1971 as dematerialization was suggested as a way to preserve 
direct communication.  At that time, all 50 states required that certificated shares at least be available 
to shareholders upon request, and a changeover was considered prohibitive.  Today, all states still 
provide only for registered shares (as opposed to bearer shares)
239 and allow the company to treat the 
registered shareholder as the person entitled to exercise the rights from the shares.  Yet it appears that 
the indirect holding system has become so deeply entrenched that the SEC is more willing to move 
toward a type of shares wholly foreign to the United States than to allow direct, electronic links to 
send securities settlement information to transfer agents on a real time basis, which – as will be 
discussed in Part IV – would reinstate stockholder lists to their pre-1970's state of information.   
                                                       
234   17 CFR §240.14a-16(a). 
235   See 17 CFR §240.14b-1(d)(2); § 240.14b-2(b)(2), (d)(2). 
236   17 CFR §240.14a-16(j); §240.14b-1(d)(4); §240.14b-2(d)(4). 
237   17 CFR §240.14a-16(j) ("The registrant must send . . . to the record holder or respondent bank . . . a paper 
copy of the proxy statement, information statement, annual report . . . ."). 
238   See 17 CFR §240.14a-16(a)(2). 
239   A search in the library "All States" on WestLaw for the words "bearer share" pulls up only cases referring 
to foreign companies (usually South or Central American) in U.S. Courts.  Also, an examination of the 
corporate law statutes of the states of Delaware, New York, California, Illinois and Texas, as well as the 
Model Business Corporation Act confirms that only registered shares are foreseen.  
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IV.  SETTLEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS IN IMMOBILIZED SECURITIES 
1.  The DTCC Securities Settlement System 
When considering BASIC's 1971 argument to make NYSE's Central Certificate Service the core 
of the U.S. clearing and settlement infrastructure, the SEC explained that in the case of a centralized 
system  based  on  the  immobilization  of  certificates,  "for  maximum  effectiveness,  the  depositories 
would have to encompass close to the maximum number of transactions effected in the marketplace in 
which it is designed to serve."
240  In 1980, the SEC repeated this opinion as a criterion for registering 
clearing agencies.
241 Placing 100% of a market's securities in the hands of one entity and entering them 
all  in  its  name  obviates  both  the  physical  movement  of  securities  and  the  need  to  change  the 
stockholders list in connection with a transfer.  Its effect on transaction costs might be compared to the 
simplicity of real estate transactions in a country where all property belongs to the crown.  With 
respect to paperwork, total immobilization has the same effect as dematerializing the entire market, of 
course with the regretful side effect of forcing the nation's issuers to cede shareholder data to the 
depository and its participants.  Today this end has been achieved by DTCC.  It has been estimated 
that the DTCC system includes more than 99% of the depository-eligible securities in circulation on 
the U.S. capital markets.
242  Since securities are now issued with the intention of introducing them into 
the DTCC system, they are certificated as "jumbo" or "global" certificates
243 that evidence millions of 
dollars of securities on one certificate, and whose size is limited only by the amount for which DTC 
can obtain insurance on a single piece of paper.  
DTCC  is  a  stock  corporation  operated  primarily  by  seconded  officers  of  its  customer-
shareholders,
244 and  can  be  understood  as  the  direct  successor  of  the  CCS  prototype.  It  currently 
operates a number of subsidiaries, including DTC as depository and the National Securities Clearing 
                                                       
240   See SEC, UNSAFE PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 54, at 187. 
241   Regulation of Clearing Agencies, SEC Release No. 16900, (June 17, 1980), published in Vol. 20 SEC 
Docket  p.  434  (July  1,  1980)  ("The  clearing agencies  registered  with the  Commission  are  essential  to 
Congressional  policy  which  includes  a  national  clearance  and  settlement  system  for  securities  and  the 
encouragement  of  broad  scale  participant  [sic.]  therein  by  securities  professionals  so  as  to  reduce  the 
physical movement of securities certificates. Such broad scale participation will result in the concentration 
of securities in a limited number of entities"). 
242   In 2004 DTCC's General Counsel Richard B. Nesson estimated that "somewhere North of 99%" of the 
depository-eligible securities in the United States were included within the DTCC system. SEC Historical 
Society,  Fireside  Chat:  "Business  Recovery  Requirements  for  Clearance  and  Settlement  in  Light  of 
September  11th"  (Nov.  11,  2004),  available  at  www.sechistorical.org.  In  2000,  the  Securities  Industry 
Association reported that approximately 83% of the securities traded on the NYSE were processed in the 
DTC  system.  SECURITIES  INDUSTRY  ASSOCIATION,  SECURITIES  DEMATERIALIZATION  WHITE  PAPER  17 
(June 2000). 
243   U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, supra note [♦], at D.  
244   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 50 et seq.  
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Corporation (NSCC), which began in the 1970's as the clearing agent of the NASD and currently 
operates as the "central counterparty"
245 for the U.S. securities markets.
246 The DTCC model is seen 
not only by the United States, but also by both the European Union and the Group of Thirty as an 
example of settlement efficiency and professional competence.  According to its 2006 annual report, 
DTCC and its subsidiaries held $36 trillion in securities in custody,
247 processed an average of $6.1 
trillion of transactions each business day,
248 and on one record volume day in early 2007, processed 
76.7 million transactions.
249  Overall, for 2006, DTCC settled transactions with a total value of about 
$1.53 quadrillion (i.e., 1.53 x  10
15).
250  As said, NSCC serves as the central counterparty for trades 
settled on U.S. markets,
251 which means that it interposes itself as a seller for every buyer and buyer 
for every seller.
252 NCSS has roughly 4,000 clearing participants
253 whose short and long positions 
against each other NSCC nets multilaterally, so that it must actually make deliveries only on the 
remaining,  net  positions  through  settlement  accounts  the  participants  hold  with  DTC  and  in  the 
Federal  Reserve  System.
254 In  2006  NSCC  succeeded  in  netting  out  nearly  98%  of  U.S.  market 
transactions, having a total value of $174.9 trillion, and made deliveries of the remaining, net sums 
totaling $3.8 trillion, to the participants of the DTCC settlement network.
255 If the transactions are in 
certificated  securities  "deposited"  with  DTC,  its  nominee  Cede  &  Co.  remains  the  registered 
shareholder of all securities transferred.
256 Before taking a look at exactly how these transactions are 
settled, it is useful to turn back to the UCC for a moment, to see how Article 8 was amended in 1978 
and again in 1994 to accommodate the centralized depository system. 
                                                       
245   "A central counterparty (CCP) interposes itself between trade counterparties, becoming the buyer to every 
seller and the seller to every buyer. Thus, from the point of view of market participants the credit risk of the 
CCP is substituted for the credit risk of the other participants."  CPSS & IOSCO, supra note 2, at 11. 
246   See National Securities Clearing Corporation, Rules & Procedures (version of June 29, 2007), available at 
http://www.nscc.com (hereinafter "NSCC Rules"), Rules 8, Sec. 1, 11, Sec. 1 (a). See also GUTTMAN, supra  
note 8, at §9:14, p. 9-27 et seq.; LOADER, supra note 2, at 13. 
247   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 27. 
248   Id. at 9. 
249   Id. at 11. 
250   Id. at 4. 
251   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Sec. 1 (b). The transactions processed in the DTCC system include not only those of 
the NYSE and the Nasdaq Stock Market, but also those executed on the regional exchanges. DTCC 2006 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 16 
252   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Sec. 1 (b). See also GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at §9:15, p. 9-31. 
253   See the NSCC Membership Directory (version of July 2, 2007), available at www.nscc.com.  
254   NSCC Rules, Rule 11. See also GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at §9:14, p. 9-28 et seq. 
255   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 21. 
256   DTC Rules, Rule 61.  
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2. Security Entitlements to Financial Assets Held in Securities Accounts 
(a)  Adapting the UCC to Immobilization 
As discussed in Part I, to qualify as a protected (bona fide) purchaser of a certificated registered 
share under the UCC the certificate must be indorsed to the purchaser, and to receive rights as a 
shareholder  under  corporate  law  the  shareholding  must  be  entered  on  the  stockholders  list.  As 
discussed in Part II, however, these paper-intensive activities bring the process of securities settlement 
to a standstill, and were thus eliminated by placing securities in the vaults of a central depository and 
registering them in the name of its nominee.  In order to both allow efficient settlement and protect the 
market from inefficient apprehension of adverse claims, commercial law had to be amended.
257  In 
1978, at the time of the first amendments following the 1975 Act that imposed immobilization, the 
Article 8 Drafting Committee still hoped that "changes in ownership would continue to be reflected by 
changes in the records of the issuer."
258 The transfer of uncertificated securities on the books of issuers 
would  have  allowed  efficient,  high  volume  settlement  without  sacrificing  the  direct  relationship 
between issuers and shareholders. However, as the Drafting Committee noted in 1994, "[a]lthough a 
system of the sort contemplated by the 1978 amendments may well develop in the coming decades, 
this has not yet happened for most categories of securities. Mutual funds shares have long been issued 
in uncertificated form, but virtually all other forms of publicly traded corporate securities are still 
issued in certificated form."
259 By 1994 DTC was rapidly expanding the services it offered, and as will 
be  discussed  below,  was  even  able  to  absorb  an  incipient  direct  registration  system,  which  had 
originally  been  conceived  as  an  issuer  driven  network,  into  its  own  system.    Thus  the  Drafting 
Committee  took  the  step  of  cementing  the  "indirect  holding  system"  –  originally  conceived  as  a 
second-best  option  –  through  a  redesigned  Article  8  UCC  that  somewhat  resembles  the  SEC's 
shareholder  communication  rules  in  that  nothing  can  take  place  without  the  cooperation  of  the 
intermediaries.   
Under the 1994 amendments of Article 8, intermediaries are not only the registered shareholders 
controlling communication and the exercise of shareholder rights, but book entries on their accounts 
come to create the very property rights that beneficial owners have in their securities.  The Drafting 
Committee sketched out how claims against custody accounts with securities intermediaries would 
come to be the key to creating property interests in securities: 
                                                       
257   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at § 1:14, p. 1-56 et seq.; U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, "C. Indirect 
Holding System". 
258   U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, supra note 5, at "B. The Uncertificated Securities System Envisioned by 
the 1978 Amendments." 
259   U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, supra note 5, at "B. The Uncertificated Securities System Envisioned by 
the 1978 Amendments."  
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The basic rule is very simple. A person acquires a security entitlement when the securities 
intermediary  credits  the  financial  asset  to  the  person's  account.  .  .  .  Thus,  a  security 
entitlement is itself a form of property interest not merely an in personam claim against 
the intermediary. The concept of a security entitlement does, however, include a package 
of in personam rights against the intermediary.
260 
Securities intermediaries, through their book entries, control all transfers of ownership in respect of 
securities  within  the  system,  and  such  transfers  receive  the  same  protected  status  as  bona  fide 
purchases  have  traditionally  received  pursuant  to  the  law  of  negotiable  instruments.
261   Amended 
Article 8 created a revised system of book-entry transfers in a wholly new Part 5 of that article, 
primarily through the coining of four, custom made concepts.  
The first concept is "securities intermediary," the entity that is authorized to create these new 
property interests, and includes either an SEC authorized "clearing corporation" or any person that is 
in the business of maintaining securities accounts for others.
262 The "securities account" referred to in 
this definition is the second concept, and is an account to which a financial asset may be credited 
under an account agreement giving the accountholder the right to dispose over the financial assets in 
the account.
263 The term "financial assets" used in this second definition is the third concept, and 
specifies  a  very  broad  category  of  items,  including  all  forms  of  securities,  and  ultimately  "any 
property" held in a securities account if the securities intermediary expressly agrees to treat it as a 
financial asset.
264 The claim that an accountholder has against the security intermediary to the financial 
assets in his securities account is the fourth term, the "security entitlement" referred to in the quotation 
above, and is a "is a pro rata property interest" in all interests in a specific financial asset that a 
securities  intermediary  holds  in  its  accounts.
265   Thus,  rather  than  saying  that  a  selling  customer 
transfers the buyer her claim against her broker for 10 shares of ABC stock in her brokerage account, 
the conceptual framework of revised Article 8 would have us say that the securities intermediary 
extinguishes  the  seller's  security  entitlement  to  financial  assets  (10  shares  of  ABC  stock)  in  her 
securities account and establishes a new security entitlement with like content in favor of the buyer. 
The Drafting Committee explains that this "transaction . . . is not a 'transfer' of the same entitlement 
from one person to another."
266 
                                                       
260   U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, supra note 5, at "C. Indirect Holding System." 
261   U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, supra note 5, at "D. Need for Different Legal Rules for the Direct and 
Indirect Holding Systems"; GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at , § 1:13, § 1:14, p. 1-56 et seq. 
262   U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (2005). 
263   U.C.C. § 8-501(a) (2005); GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at , § 1:15, p. 1-58 ff., § 9:7, p. 9-13 et seq. 
264   U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) and Off. Comm. (2005). 
265   U.C.C. § 8-503(b) and Off. Comm. (2005); U.C.C., Article 8 Prefatory Note, "C. Indirect Holding System." 
266   U.C.C., § 8-501, Off. Comm. 5 (2005).   
 
Draft of September 18, 2007. © David C. Donald 
 
42  IV.  SETTLEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS IN IMMOBILIZED SECURITIES 
The concept of a "security entitlement" allows transactions to take place at all levels of the 
indirect holding system: under Article 8 a clearing participant would have security entitlements for the 
contents of its account with DTC, a broker using the participant as a depository would have security 
entitlements for the contents of its account,
267 and a retail investor would have security entitlements for 
the contents of her account with the broker.  The "security entitlement" construct is a fascinating 
exercise in legislative fiat because it has almost exclusively the characteristics of an in personem 
contract  right,  but  by  express  legislative  dictate  is  given  the  status  of  a  property  right.
268 An 
"entitlement holder" may take action against a third party who has unjustly received the holder's 
security entitlement only if: 
1.  the securities intermediary holding the account has entered insolvency proceedings; 
2.  it  doesn't have sufficient  interests  in the  relevant asset  to  satisfy  all its outstanding 
security entitlements  
3.  because it violated a duty under § 8-504 UCC to maintain such amounts; 
4.  the transferee of the security entitlement did not give value for or obtain control of the 
entitlement, or acted in collusion with the securities intermediary; and 
5.  the trustee or liquidator fails to take action to recover the asset.
269 
This right, which is exercisable only against the intermediary except in the extremely unlikely event of 
the above conditions being met, has been designated as a "property" right because a prime interest of 
securities settlement is to insure that the beneficial owner can recover deposited securities in the event 
that the intermediary becomes insolvent,
270 and a property interest is the surest route to that end.  It 
says much about the pragmatic flexibility of the United States that while other countries have debated 
for decades about whether this type of relationship can pursuant to healthy doctrine be placed under 
the legal category of "property",
271 the UCC accomplished the desired end by simple legislative dictate 
without any real concern for logical consistency. 
3. Transferring Security Entitlements within the DTCC System 
Once shares of stock have been deposited with DTC – probably in the form of one or two global 
certificates for an entire issue – or entered in the direct registration system
272 and registered in the 
                                                       
267   But see note 283 and accompanying text. 
268   U.C.C. § 8-503(b) (2005) ("An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular financial 
asset under subsection (a) is a pro rata property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by the 
securities intermediary …"). 
269   U.C.C. § 8-503(d), (e) (2005). 
270   U.C.C. § 8-503, Off. Comm. 1 (2005). 
271   See  e.g.  DOROTHEE  EINSELE,  WERTPAPIERRECHT  ALS  SCHULDRECHT:  FUNKTIONSVERLUST  VON 
EFFEKTENURKUNDEN IM INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR (1995). 
272   See Part IV, Section 4.  
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name of Cede & Co., exchange trading will bring about "transfers" of security entitlements, not shares.  
Although § 8-504 UCC requires intermediaries to maintain sufficient interests in financial assets to 
cover all of their outstanding security entitlements,
273 entitlements themselves are created by either a 
book entry or a legal duty to make a book entry, even when sufficient numbers of entitlements against 
a  higher  level  account  or  of  securities  do  not  exist.
274 The  UCC's  term  for  an  instruction  to  an 
intermediary to extinguish or procure a security entitlement is "entitlement order".
275  If, for example, 
an investor were to instruct his broker to sell "securities" in his account, the broker after placing the 
corresponding market or limit order would debit the customer's securities account so as to extinguish 
specific security entitlements and credit his cash account. Similarly to an indorsement, an entitlement 
order must be given by an appropriate person or such person's legal representative.
276 Entitlement 
orders are usually given electronically or by phone, but can also be given in writing.
277 As with an 
indorsement,  the  intermediary  has  a  right  to  reasonably  assure  itself  that  the  entitlement  order  is 
genuine and authorized.
278 The same system of medallion guarantee as applies to indorsements can 
also  be  used  to  guarantee  the  signature  on  an  entitlement  order.
279 For  electronic  orders,  market 
participants use digital signatures or specific identification protocols.
280 
As said, the principal task of the 1994 amendments of Article 8 was to replicate the various 
protections  of  the  law  of  (certificated)  negotiable  instruments  for  "transfers"  of  entitlements  to 
financial assets held in securities accounts.  Under amended Article 8, for the recipient of a security 
entitlement to be protected against an adverse claim to the entitlement, he must acquire it for value and 
without notice of the adverse claim.
281 In order to protect transaction flow, Article 8 raises the bar for 
finding an intermediary liable if it makes book entries despite receiving notice of an adverse claim:  a 
securities intermediary that acts on an effective entitlement order is not liable to a person with an 
adverse  claim  unless  the  intermediary  acts  contrary  to  an  injunction  or  restraining  order,  or  in 
                                                       
273   U.C.C. § 8-504(a) (2005). 
274   U.C.C. § 8-501(c) (2005).  
275   U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(8) and 8-507 (2005); see also GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at , § 9:11, p. 9-21 et seq. 
276   See U.C.C. §§ 8-507(a) and 8-107(a)(3) (2005). 
277   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at §§8:11, p. 8-17 et seq. 
278   U.C.C. § 8-507(a) (2005). 
279   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at § 9:11, p. 9-22 et seq. 
280   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at §§ 8:13, p. 8-20 et seq. 
281   U.C.C. § 8-502 (2005).  
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collusion  with  the  wrongdoer.
282   Intermediaries  can  protect  themselves  against  taking  action  on 
ineffective entitlement orders by requiring signature guarantees for entitlement orders. 
Seen from the perspective of the securities exchange where a trade is executed and moving into 
the  settlement  system  and  down  the pyramid of  custody  accounts  towards  the  retail  investor,  the 
settlement process within the DTCC system is governed by the rules of NSCC and DTC – which do 
not conflict with Article 8, but would take precedence over it if they did
283 – and then by contractual 
agreements and Article 8.  First, the relevant trading system delivers matched trade data to NSCC.
284  
Although NSCC can settle various types of trades at different speeds, such as arranging direct delivery 
and payment for manually processed block trades or trades in foreign securities (referred to as "special 
trades"),
285 normal  exchange  transactions  would  be  settled  as  part  of  NSCC's  "continuous  net 
settlement" (CNS) process.
286  In this process, NSCC acts as central counterparty and thus assumes the 
rights and duties of the parties to each matched transaction,
287 including ownership of the security 
entitlements involved.
288  NSCC's continuous net settlement nets short and long positions in the same 
securities against each other multilaterally on a continuous basis, and instructs DTC to credit and debit 
the  remaining  net  amount  to  the  securities  accounts  of  its  participants.
289   Amounts  that  remain 
unsettled during a cycle are continuously carried forward and included in the processing of the next 
cycle of CNS.
290  On each settlement day, credits or debits are made to participant accounts only for 
the  fractionally  small  net  quantities  actually  necessary  for  the  netted  transactions  settled,  and  the 
process continues to unfold during a period that is limited to three days by SEC rule for any given 
trade (T+3).
291 Participants grant DTC or another "qualified securities depository" authority to make 
the credits and debits to their accounts as necessary.
292  Unless they reflect trading solely between 
                                                       
282   U.C.C. § 8-115 (2005). See also GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at § 6:12, p. 6-39 et seq., § 7:15, p. 7-44.4 et seq. 
Of course when an intermediary trades on its own account, the rule on notice of an adverse claim applicable 
to ordinary purchasers will apply. 
283   U.C.C. § 8-111 (2005).  DTC expressly removes transactions from the applicability of the New York UCC 
by specifying that a "settlement account" held by a participant with DTC "is not a “securities account” for 
purposes of Section 8-501 of the NYUCC."  DTC Rules, Rule 1.  
284   NSCC Rules, Rule 7; Procedure II. 
285   See NSCC Rules, Rules 1, 11, Sec. 9  
286   See NSCC Rules, Rules 5, 11; Procedures V und VII. 
287   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Sec. 1. 
288   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Sec. 2. 
289   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Procedure VII. 
290   NSCC Rules, Rule 11, Sec. 1(a), Procedure VII. 
291   NSCC  Rules,  Rule  11,  Sec.  3.    Trades  on  national  securities  exchanges  must  settle  by  the  third  day 
following the trade (referred to as T+3). 17 CFR § 240.15c6-1(a). 
292   NSCC Rules, Rules 1, 11, Sec. 3; DTC Rules, Rule 9(B).  
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clearing participants, the book entries on DTC accounts would be followed by book entries creating 
and extinguishing security entitlements on the accounts of the downstream firms that are not clearing 
participants, working their way down the chain of intermediaries until they reach the account a private 
investor holds with her broker.  During the entire process, the transfer agent would make no changes 
to the stockholders list and the issuer would be completely unaware of changes in ownership unless 
they triggered a filing with the SEC. 
The cash leg of the settlement process follows a similar, but not identical route. The settlement 
accounts for participants are not held with DTC, but with a bank that they specify to DTC and NSCC 
as their "settling bank".
293 A settling bank must be a bank or trust company subject to federal or state 
supervision  or  regulation,  sign  a  Settling  Bank  Agreement,  and  be  connected  to  the  National 
Settlement Service (NSS) of the Federal Reserve System, through which the short and long positions 
of  participants  arising  out  of  the  CNS  process  are  debited  and  credited.
294   Because  cash,  unlike 
securities, is fungible between all transactions regardless of the security bought or sold, NSCC can net 
the net credits and debits due to or from various accounts held with a given settling bank in order to 
create a "net-net position" that will be credited to or debited from the bank.
295  In contrast to the credits 
and debits of securities, the system rules give banks the option of initiating their own transfers to cover 
net-net  short  positions,
296 or  granting  DTC  and  NCSS  authority  to  pull  funds  from  their  clearing 
accounts  to  cover  net-net  short  positions.
297 Figure  B  roughly  sketches  the  manner  in  which  a 
transaction takes place in the DTCC System. 
                                                       
293   See NSCC Rules, Rule 55; DTC Rules, Rules 9(B). 
294   DTC Rules, Rules 9(B), 9(D).  Before 2007, debits ran on NSS and credits on Fedwire. A concentration of 
payments made on Fedwire at the close of each business day from various payment and settlement systems 
caused  congestion,  and  thus  all  settlement  cash  traffic  was  shifted  to  NSS.  See  Self-Regulatory 
Organizations;  The  Depository  Trust  Company;  Notice  of  Filing  and  Immediate  Effectiveness  of  a 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Use of the National Settlement Service, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
56126, 72 Fed. Reg. 42160 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
295   DTC Rules, Rule 9(D). 
296   DTC Rules, Rules 9(B), 9(D); NSCC Rules, Rules 12, 55. 
297   See NSCC Rules, Rule 12, Sec. 1 ("The Corporation shall debit or credit … Settling Members … with the 
amounts payable and receivable").  
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4. The Direct Registration System 
(a) Creation of the Direct Registration System  
Beginning January 1, 2008, all issues listed on the NYSE and the Nasdaq Stock Market will 
have to be eligible for inclusion in the direct registration system (DRS).  DRS had its origin in the 
TAD  system  discussed  in  Part  II,  which  was  favored  by  all  market  participants  in  1971,  viewed 
favorably by the market again in the survey taken by the SEC in 1976, and still constituted a goal of 
the UCC Drafting Committee in 1978.  If the DRS as originally envisaged had been fully operational 
in the 1980's the 1978 amendments of Article 8 would have likely proved sufficient for high volumes 
of  transfers  on  the  books  of  the  issuers  and  the  indirect  communication  rules  would  have  been 
unnecessary.  As discussed in Parts I and II, the 1976 SEC study fell on either side of promoting a 
settlement system that favored communications, so a settlement system was evaluated based on pure 
market efficiency criteria and rules were then designed by the Corporate Finance Division to facilitate 
communication  around  or  through  such  systems.    Computer  and  communications  technology 
continued to develop, however, and the securities markets accelerated their inevitable turn towards 
dematerialization.  Germany, which had made part of its government debt issues purely uncertificated 
as early as 1910,
298 completed the job by dematerializing all government securities in 1972.
299 In 1981, 
France dematerialized its entire market by legislative decree.
300  The United States followed in 1986, 
by completely dematerializing government securities.
301 Thus a dematerialized equity market had a 
number of prominent examples to imitate. 
In 1994, just as the UCC Drafting Committee was solidifying the indirect holding system in a 
revised Article 8, the SEC announced its intention to support the development of "an issuer/transfer 
agent operated book-entry registration system" that "would allow any retail investor who wants his or 
her securities to be registered directly on the books of the issuer" to do so.
302  Although modeled on 
systems used in dividend reinvestment and stock purchase programs, this project clearly descended 
from the TAD system so highly praised in 1971 and 1976, when market participants still considered 
immobilization as a temporary, second-best solution.  The model had been proposed in 1991 by a 
group co-chaired by the Securities Transfer Association (STA) and the American Society of Corporate 
                                                       
298   See CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, BANKVERTRAGRECHT margin no. 2052 (2
nd ed. 1981). 
299   See HEINSIUS, HORN & THAN, supra note 102, at § 42 margin no. 6.  
300   See Antoine Maffei, Pour une modernisation du régime de la dématérialisation en France: le projet Paris 
Europlace, in 20 ANS DE DÉMATÉRIALISATION DES TITRES EN FRANCE: BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES NATIONALES 
ET INTERNATIONALES 103 (Hubert de Vauplane, ed. 2005). 
301   See GUTTMAN, supra  note 8, at § 1:13, p. 1-52 et seq.; 31 CFR §§ 357.0 – 357.45.  
302   Concept Release, Transfer Agents Operating Direct Registration System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
35038, 59 Fed. Reg. 63652, 63653 (Dec. 8, 1994) (hereinafter "DRS Release").  
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Secretaries (ASCS) "to offer investors an additional choice of security ownership in the form of an 
account statement, so that their securities could be registered in their own name on the books of the 
issuer."
303  The STA and the ASCS, both of whose members work closely with issuers, discussed their 
original proposal with the Securities Industry Association (SIA), whose members are broker-dealers, 
and reached agreement on a structure that would "allow a broker-dealer to deliver electronically to a 
transfer agent a customer's request that the securities be registered on the books of the issuer in book-
entry form . . . [and] the transfer agent to send an electronic acknowledgment to the broker-dealer that 
the securities have been registered in the customer's name on the books of the issuer in book-entry 
form."
304  The main operational function of DRS is to allow shares to be shuttled back and forth 
between the accounts of the transfer agent (for registration and holding) and the broker (for trading 
purposes). 
The  two,  key  prerequisites  unfulfilled  in  the  1970's  –  dematerialization  of  shares  and  high 
quality  electronic  communications  networks  –  had  moved  toward  reality  in  1994.    However,  a 
transition to a decentralized DRS operated by transfer agents would have meant returning to issuers 
the shareholder data they ceded to intermediaries in the 1970's, and removing intermediaries from their 
central role between issuers and shareholders, a role in which they control all shareholder information, 
are indispensible for the exercise of voting rights, and even create the property interests in securities 
through their custody accounts.  Indeed, between the legislative imposition of immobilization in 1975 
and  the  public  notice-and-comment  period  on  DRS  in  1995,  the  indirect  holding  system  had 
considerably solidified.  Brokers grew into their roles as indispensible middlemen.  An entire industry 
sprang up to distribute proxy materials and was dominated by ADP, whose functions in this regard 
were spun off into Broadridge Financial Solutions in 2007.  DTC and NSCC kept expanding their 
services and capacities and were joined together within the DTCC holding company in 1999, which 
has  continued  to  create  new  solutions  for  the  problems  that  are  in  part  caused  by  its  very 
intermediation.  In addition, as discussed at length above, Article 8 UCC was custom-tailored to a 
system brokered by intermediaries.  In light of this dynamic adaption of the market to congressionally 
imposed immobilization, it should come as no surprise that DTC and its owners, the broker-dealer 
community, took the position that the original concept of an "issuer operated" DRS was problematic. 
Following their rational self interest, the financial intermediaries pulled the new DRS concept into the 
central depository that they owned and controlled. 
                                                       
303   Id.  
304   DRS Release, supra note 302, at 63654.  
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On  November  11,  1996,  DRS  became  operational.
305   During  the  years  that  followed,  two 
camps competed to push through their different visions of the form that DRS should ultimately take.  
On the one side were issuers and transfer agents, and on the other were broker-dealers and the entities 
they owned, such as DTC and the stock exchanges.  In 1999, brokers and DTC argued that DRS 
should be integrated into DTC's "Profile Modification System" for communication purposes, the result 
of which would be to subject transfer agents to the supervision and approval of DTC because they 
would have to be DTC participants to take part in DRS.
306 Brokers found that the current system 
presented  "unreasonable  delays"  in  allowing  "shareholders  to  'recover'  their  shares"  out  of  direct 
registration  and  transfer  them  into  the  broker's  accounts  for  trading  purposes.
307  The  aim  of 
commenters "representing primarily broker-dealers" was, as the SEC explained: 
Profile will allow a DTC participant (i.e., a broker-dealer) upon instructions from the 
participant's customer to electronically request that a "DRS limited participant" of DTC 
(i.e., a transfer agent) to move the customer's DRS positions to the participant's account at 
DTC.
308 
On the other hand, as the SEC noted:  
[C]ommenters, representing primarily issuers and transfer agents, support continuation of 
DRS as it is currently operating. . . . These commenters believe that the unrestricted 
ability  to  allow  issues  to  be  made  eligible  in  DRS  is  in  the  public  interest.  These 
commenters contend that DRS as it is operating today (i.e., without Profile) benefits the 
marketplace  by  providing  shareholders  with  another  option  on  how  to  hold  their 
securities.
309  
Issuers and transfer agents also expressed concern that the Profile System did not offer adequate 
security against unauthorized persons extracting securities from direct registration.
310  If connection to 
Profile were made a prerequisite for participating in DRS, no transfer agent could use DRS without 
becoming a participant of DTC and no issuer could place their securities in DRS without meeting DTC 
eligibility requirements. This of course would kill the idea of setting up DRS as an alternative to the 
centralized DTC model.  In the many releases regarding the adoption of DRS, the SEC never indicated 
awareness  of  a  conflict  of  interest  that  brokers  may  have  in  advocating  a  system  in  which 
                                                       
305   Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company; Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Procedure to Establish a Direct Registration System, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-37931, 61 Fed. Reg. 58600, 58601 (Nov. 15, 1996). 
306   Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company; Notice of Filing of Amendment and Order 
Granting  Accelerated  Approval  of  a  Proposed  Rule  Change  Relating  to  Implementation  of  the  Profile 
Modification System Feature of the Direct Registration System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41862, 64 
Fed. Reg. 51162, 51163 (Sept. 21, 1999). 
307   Id. 
308   Id. 
309   Id. at 51164. 
310   Id.  
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intermediaries take over and control shareholder data.  In the end, as it appeared to be a pure question 
of system efficiency, the SEC sided with the position of the brokers, and concluded that excluding 
transfer agents from DRS unless DTC admitted them to the Profile Modification System created a 
"more efficient mechanism."
311  This follows the logic expressed by BASIC in 1971 that maximum 
efficiency can be reached by approaching a complete monopoly on settlement services.  However, 
BASIC's point was that the more securities that were immobilized under the name of one entity, the 
more  trades  that  could  take  place  electronically  on  the  accounts  of  that  entity.    Monopoly  over 
communication systems for financial data makes no more sense than monopoly over data transmission 
in general.  After its incorporation into Profile, any transfer agent wishing to take part in DRS would 
have to become a limited participant of DTC, which as a Self Regulatory Organization would approve 
the limited participant's admission and supervise its behavior.
312  To address the concerns of transfer 
agents that unauthorized persons could use Profile to withdraw securities from DRS, an automatic 
guarantee
313 backed by a surety
314 was incorporated into the Profile Modification System.  In its 2006 
annual report, DTCC referred to DRS as "DTCC’s Direct Registration System (DRS)."
315 
(b) Transferring Shares of Stock within DRS 
From the diagram in Figure C, we can see that the current DRS adds one significant step to the 
existing DTCC settlement system sketched in Figure B.  DRS allows shareholders to hold their shares 
with the issuer's transfer agent and register their own names (as opposed to that of an intermediary) on 
the stockholders list, and then to transfer the shares to a brokerage account if they choose to sell or 
transfer the stock for security purposes.
316  Essentially, DRS is a bridge between the two structural 
alternatives  that  have  been  discussed  since  the  publication  of  the  Lybrand  Report  in  1969: 
uncertificated shares are held in databanks managed by transfer agents for issuers, but such shares can 
then be pulled by means of an instruction on a proprietary communication network into a broker's 
account where they are re-registered in the name of the central depository. In its current form, this 
                                                       
311   Id. at 51165. 
312   Id. at 51164. 
313   Self-Regulatory Organizations; the Depository Trust Company; Order Granting Approval of a Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to the Profile Modification Feature of the Direct Registration System, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-42704, 65 Fed. Reg. 24242, 24243 et seq. (April 25, 2000). 
314   Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company; Order Granting Approval of a Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to the Profile Surety Program in the Direct  Registration System, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-43586, 65 Fed. Reg. 70745, 70746 et seq. (Nov. 27, 2000). 
315   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 27. 
316   Exchange Act Release No. 34-37931, supra note 305, at 58600.  
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bridge  is  made  possible  by  inserting  transfer  agents  as  "limited  participants"  within  the  DTCC 
system.
317  
Today, a retail investor will at the time of making a purchase state on her instruction to the 
broker whether she wishes to hold her shares in DRS in her own name or through her broker in the 
name of Cede & Co.
318  If the investor indicates no preference, each share purchased through the order 
will automatically be placed in DRS and registered in the buyer's name.
319  In the first stage, the 
transaction  executed  on  an  exchange  is  settled  through  NSCC  with  credits  and  debits  to  DTC 
participant accounts, as outlined in Section 3 rather than following the rules for the transfer of an 
uncertificated  security  discussed  in  Part  I.    Although  the  raison  d'être  for  the  use  of  account 
relationships (enabling a dematerialized transfer of a still material security) no longer exists, claims to 
accounts  and  not  (uncertificated)  securities  themselves  are  transferred  within  the  DTCC  system.  
However,  when  the  investor  elects  to  hold the  security in  DRS,  the  transfer  from  the  participant 
account at DTC to the transfer agent would extract an uncertificated security from the custody of DTC 
and change the name of registration with the transfer agent from "Cede & Co." to that of the investor.  
As explained in Part I, under Article 8, the act of entering a buyer's name on the stockholders list 
simultaneously constitutes "delivery"
320 and places the security in the "control"
321 of the buyer, which 
gives the latter "protected"
322 status against any adverse claims, provided that the buyer has given 
"value"
323 for the security. Because DRS operates only with uncertificated securities, even through the 
relationship is no longer indirect, the investor would not receive a certificate, but rather a statement of 
ownership to evidence the purchase.
324 
                                                       
317   Exchange Act Release No. 34-41862, supra note 306, at 51164; DRS GUIDELINES COMMITTEE, PROFILE 
DIRECT REGISTRATION PROCESSING GUIDELINES 9 et seq. (2004). 
318   See Exchange Act Release No. 34-37931, supra note 305, at 58601; DRS GUIDELINES COMMITTEE, supra 
note 317, at 19. 
319   See  Self-Regulatory  Organizations;  The  Depository  Trust  Company;  Order  Granting  Approval  of  a 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Movement of all DRS Issues into Profile and the Establishment of 
the "S" Position as the Default Position, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44696, 66 Fed. Reg. 43939, 43940 
(Aug. 21, 2001). 
320   U.C.C. §8-301(b)(1) (2005). 
321   U.C.C. §8-106(c)(2) (2005). 
322   U.C.C. §8-303(a) (2005). 
323   See U.C.C. §1-201(44) (2005); discussed in GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 7:13, p. 7-34 et seq.; Matthysse v. 
Securities Processing Services, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Prisbrey v. Nobel, 505 F. 
2d. 170, 176 et seq. (10
th Cir. 1974). 
324   See DRS GUIDELINES COMMITTEE, supra note 317, at 7 and DTCC, "Overview of DRS," available at 
www.dtc.org/dtcpublic/html/lob2/prod6/drsdetail.htm (hereinafter "DTCC DRS Overview").   
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The sale of a share would move in the opposite direction along the DRS bridge. When the 
investor instructs his broker to make the sale, the broker would send an instruction on the Profile 
system to pull the share out of DRS and register it in the name of Cede & Co.
325  The broker's 
instruction to pull the share would trigger a "screen indemnity" on the screen shot in the system seen 
by the transfer agent: 
1.  The broker represents that it has actual authority and consent for the request from either the 
registered  owner  or  a  duly  authorized  third  party,  and  that  all  information  provided  is 
accurate and complete (with the representation regarding taxpayer information qualified by 
actual knowledge); 
2.  The broker indemnifies the issuer and its transfer agent against any loses, costs or liabilities 
arising from a breach of the representation.
326 
Every user of the Profile system gives the above indemnification automatically and holds either a 
surety bond that pays $3 million per occurrence and an annual aggregate limit of $6 million or an 
insurance policy that pays $25 million per occurrence per policy with an annual aggregate limit of 
$100 million.
327 
Use of DRS has increased steadily since 2000.  Between September 2001 and December 2006, 
the number of DRS-eligible issues increased from 298
328 to 1,406.
329 This figure will skyrocket in 
coming years because both the NYSE and the Nasdaq Stock Market have made DRS eligibility – i.e., 
dematerialization – a listing requirement for new issues as from January 1, 2007
330 and for all issues as 
from January 1, 2008.
331 However, given the structure of DRS and its evolution from an alternative, 
issuer driven network into a feature of DTCC's service offering, an increase in DRS participation will 
not  necessarily  translate  into  an  increase  in  direct  registration  of  shareholders  and  direct 
communication between issuers and their owners. This is true primarily because brokers control the 
                                                       
325   DRS GUIDELINES COMMITTEE, supra note 317, at 26 et seq. If the relevant broker is not a participant in the 
DRS or the shareholder intends to draw her entire holding out of DRS, she must direct her instruction to the 
transfer agent. See Id. at 24, 32. 
326   See Exchange Act Release No. 34-42704, p. 24243; DTCC DRS Overview. 
327   Self-Regulatory  Organizations;  The  Depository  Trust  Company;  Notice  of  Filing  and  Immediate 
Effectiveness  of  Proposed  Rule  Change  To  Establish  an  Insurance  Program  as  Part  of  the  Profile 
Modification System Feature of Its Direct Registration System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52422, 70 
Fed. Reg. 55196 (Sept. 20, 2005). 
328   Charles  V.  Rossi,  Direct  Registration  System  (DRS)  Continues  to  Grow,  2  SECURITIES  TRANSFER 
ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER 4 (2001). 
329   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 27. 
330   See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 501.00(A); and NASD Manual, Sec. 4350(L). 
331   See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 501.00(B); and NASD Manual, Sec. 4350(L).  
 
Draft of September 18, 2007. © David C. Donald 
 
54  IV.  SETTLEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS IN IMMOBILIZED SECURITIES 
relationship  with  their  clients  and  they  are  in  a  good  position  to  convince  customers  of  the 
"convenience" of keeping their DRS shares in the name of Cede & Co., ready for a quick trade and 
"privacy" of having their names known only to the broker.  Moreover, any customer with a margin 
account must keep the shares with their broker for collateral purposes.
332  It would appear that the 
principle change that a completely dematerialized market will bring is increased efficiency and cost 
savings for DTCC itself.  A structural change to DRS is discussed in the next Section.  This change 
would both streamline the settlement process and eliminate the "flow back" phenomenon in which 
shares slide over the DRS bridge back into registration under the name of "Cede & Co."  
(b) How DRS Could Be Streamlined  
As explained above, DRS is essentially a bridge between direct registration through a transfer 
agent and depository registration through a broker, plus a proprietary communication system to move 
shares back and forth and an indemnity against unauthorized instructions.  It allows shares to be 
parked on one side of the bridge when they are held and pulled to the other side for trading.  This 
design looks very much like a supplemental accessory to a system that was conceived as necessarily 
centered around DTC.  Since the centralized system was imposed in 1975, however, computer and 
communications technology have changed dramatically, and allow data to be securely managed and 
distributed  along  decentralized  networks.    The  internet  is  only  the  best  known  example  of  such 
networks.  
If DRS were modified to operate on a "decentralized" basis, transfers could take place directly 
on a single databank that served as transfer account and stockholders list, without shuttling shares back 
and forth from direct to indirect registration.  Like a securities account maintained by an intermediary, 
the master securityholders file maintained by a transfer agent is essentially a data bank.  In the case of 
an account, the databank's entire contents are attributed to the accountholder and these contents are 
subdivided into fields for the various securities held in the account;
333 in the case of the stockholders 
list,  the  databank's  entire  contents  are  attributed  to  securities  issued  by  the  corporation  and  are 
subdivided into fields for the various shareholders and classes of securities.
334  Both databanks contain 
proprietary information that has to be protected through available security measures.  If the CNS 
operations of NSCC were tied into a network of transfer agent depositories, transfers of ownership 
resulting from trades on securities exchanges would simultaneously result in transfers of registered 
ownership.  The same kind of representations (backed by bonded or insured indemnity) currently used 
                                                       
332   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at § 6a-15, S. 6A-34 et seq. 
333   SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 153. 
334   See GUTTMAN, supra note 8, at §3.14, p. 3-34; 17 CFR § 240.17Ad–9(b).  
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in the Profile Modification System could reduce the risk of unauthorized transactions on the accounts.  
Because ownership in uncertificated shares is transferred by means of registering the buyer's name on 
the stockholders list, securities transfers would be integrally tied to the recording of record ownership.  
No  separation  between  beneficial  and  record  owners  would  ever  occur  unless  a  shareholder 
intentionally chose to remain anonymous by purchasing shares through a trust or some other fiduciary.  
If such transactions as loans or pledges of shares triggered a transfer of ownership, they would be 
visible  on  the  stockholders  list,  and  thus  the  danger  of  "empty"
335 voting  would  be  significantly 
reduced, at least when achieved through such transactions. 
It  should  also  be  remembered  that  the  word  "decentralized"  refers  to  the  manner  in  which 
information is organized rather than where it would be located.  For example, DTCC itself could set 
up a register/account for every U.S. listed company on a computer in the basement of 55 Water Street, 
New York, and the system would still be a decentralized network of stockholders lists.
336  On the other 
hand, given that information moves on fiber optic networks at about the speed of light, the individual 
register/accounts could be located at the corporate headquarters of issuers or at the headquarters of 
issuers' transfer agents without considerably slowing the settlement process.  Because an account for 
each listed company would be attached to such a system, it might be argued that netting would be less 
efficient.  This argument displays the type of changes that a TAD system could bring about, and is 
thus addressed at some length in following. 
As discussed above, NSCC nets multilaterally all transactions in a given security between its 
clearing participants.  For the cash leg of the settlement process, NSCC can net the long and short 
positions of participants using a common settling bank to reach a "net-net" position for that settling 
bank.  Because of this process, actual delivery within the DTCC system has to take place for only 
about 2% of the transactions actually conducted on U.S. exchanges.  The savings in time and capacity 
utilization  for  the  core  settlement  system  are  substantial.    An  increase  in  the  number  of  clearing 
participants could decrease the percentage of the volume netted away because it is unlikely that a 
given participant's daily transactions can be completely netted down to zero.  Thus, although 98% of 
transaction volume can be netted out in the current system, the remaining 2% may well be composed 
of a remainder spread across all entities taking part in the settlement process on a given day.  If NSCC 
has about 4,000 clearing participants, it may be that some portion of the remaining 2% of transaction 
                                                       
335   See  Henry  T.C.  Hu  &  Bernard  Black,  Empty  Voting  and  Hidden  (Morphable)  Ownership:  Taxonomy, 
Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1024 et seq. (2006).  
336   The current regulation of the activity of transfer agents and clearing agencies could, however, subject any 
such structure to regulatory difficulties, as it might well bring about an unauthorized mixing of functions.  
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volume  goes  to  each  participant  that  entered  into  transactions  on  that  day.
337   With  a  settlement 
structure based on a register/account for each listed issuer, the number of accounts participating in 
netting would equal the number of listed issuers whose shares were traded on that day, which may 
well be higher than the number of clearing participants that trade.  This could reduce the transactional 
volume that could be efficiently eliminated by netting. 
This view, however, focuses solely on the costs and efficiency of the settlement system.  It 
displays the same narrow focus that allows a settlement system to be considered "efficient" although it 
generates burdensome externalities to be paid by issuers in shareholder communications in particular 
and corporate governance in general.  If we focus solely on the tip of the custodial pyramid and see 
that 99.9% of transactions can be netted away, that does not mean that the individual buyers and 
sellers in the transactions disappear.  At some point downstream, the net amounts still have to be 
unbundled and distributed to the regional institutions and retail investors who initiated the buy or sell 
orders.
338  An example might make this point somewhat clearer.  Suppose that the U.S. Postal Service 
announced a super efficient method for delivering mail to New York City: they bundle the mail up as 
it arrives from hubs in the South, West and North, pin it down with a sturdy net onto a large, wood 
pallet, and drop it by parachute into Central Park, which reduces their distribution costs by 99.9%.  Is 
this efficient mail delivery? The mail indeed arrives in New York this way, but it still has to be 
unbundled and delivered by someone (whose costs in this example are not on the USPS balance 
sheet).  If a DRS based on register/accounts for each listed issuer did not allow as high a volume of 
transactions to be netted as currently is the case, it would nevertheless offer the consolation that once 
the entry on the register/account was effected, the ultimate buyer or seller would be served.  No partial 
rights would have to then be unbundled and passed along chains of intermediaries downstream to the 
beneficial owners.  Centralized netting, while generating impressive numbers like the elimination of 
98% percent of transactions, can in effect result in delivering complex bundles to downstream entities, 
which have to unbundle the transactions and complete the work connected with sale or purchase. 
                                                       
337   DTCC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 21. 
338   The net-net sum calculated for the cash leg provides a good example of the unpacking that super-netting 
requires from downstream entities. As discussed, pursuant to NSCC Rule 55, the net short and long cash 
position of a settling bank and all its participant customers are netted against each other a second time to 
produced a condensed figure, which substantially reduces the actual flow of funds.  However, the bank then 
has to unbundle this amount into payments to/from itself and all of its accountholders participating in the 
settlement process.  Reduction of actual flows does not mean reduction of processing costs, and reduced 
flows are most significant when cash or certificates need to be physically delivered, which today is rarely 
the case.  As a result, the "reduction" of processing costs at the tip of the custodial pyramid is actually a 
shifting of such costs to entities more distant from the center of the settlement process, and the power of 
such entities to change the process usually decreases with their increased distance from the center.  
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The use of register/accounts in connection with share lending displays yet another difference 
between the intermediated and the direct systems.  Share lending is a highly recommended technique 
for avoiding settlement fails,
339 and should thus be encouraged.  Central security depositories (CSDs) 
like DTC are advantageous for lending programs because they hold large amounts of a given class of 
securities and thus form a liquid pool for share loans.
340  Thus share lending is a profitable service that 
CSDs can offer.  In recent years some discussion has been dedicated to the problem of "empty" voting 
by persons who borrow shares in which they have no economic interest, and proposals have been 
made to expand the various schedules filed under § 13 Exchange Act to create information on share 
lending.
341  Like information for shareholder communications, information on share lending can be 
best captured at the source, and a register/account that records changes in ownership simultaneous to 
changes of record shareholders would be such a source.  Thus, depending on how the loan were 
structured, a TAD system might well be able to provide the kind of information necessary to avoid 
"empty" voting.  However, by moving the information out of the intermediaries it could also move the 
fees out of the intermediaries.  A register/account would be a good place for share lending because it 
would contain all the shares of a given class.  One could even imagine shareholders agreeing in the 
issuer's certificate of incorporation to terms and condition of a share lending program to which they 
could opt in if they wanted to earn extra income from their shares.  This way, lending would not only 
be transparent, but the profitability of lending would go to individual shareholders rather than having a 
large portion of it being spread throughout various intermediaries. 
These examples of netting and share lending teach us something about the overall design and 
effects of the indirect holding system.  It shifts heavy costs (negative externalities) on to persons 
outside of the central circle of the system and creates opportunities for persons within it.  The structure 
was chosen in an emergency situation, and the fact that it generates heavy externalities was accepted 
because no other alternative was in sight.  Now that almost all states permit uncertificated securities, 
custody accounts are no longer necessary to create the effect of a faux dematerialization.  Now that 
fiber optic networks can send proprietary financial information with high security at the speed of light, 
it is no longer necessary that registration of transfers be avoided by placing America's shares in the 
name of Cede & Co. and flushing transaction costs downstream to others. To grasp the overall effect 
                                                       
339   For an authoritative discussion of the advantages of securities lending, see TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO) & COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND 
SETTLEMENT  SYSTEMS  (CPSS),  SECURITIES  LENDING  TRANSACTIONS:  MARKET  DEVELOPMENT  AND 
IMPLICATIONS 24 et seq. (1999). 
340   SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 325. 
341   Hu & Black, supra note 335, at 1054 et seq., and Kahan & Rock, supra note 209, at 29 et seq.  
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of a securities settlement design, the SEC should include and evaluate all costs and the efficiency of 
all stages of a transaction, not only those that are generated at the tip of the custodial pyramid.  Indeed, 
during  its  entire  history  the  SEC  has  consistently  displayed  a  strong  willingness  to  serve  small 
investors and the society at large.  Why then, do issuers still cede their shareholders to intermediaries 
although this is unnecessary for an efficient system of securities settlement?  Why do intermediaries 
earn fees on services that are necessitated by their very involvement in the process?  Why does a 
structural inefficiency exist that it large enough to host an entire industry of proxy distribution services 
like Broadridge?  Part V offers some possible reasons why the indirect holding system lingers on 
despite its costs. 
 
V. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM'S CURIOUS ENDURANCE 
The reasons for a capital market in which intermediaries control all shareholder data and issuers 
are  isolated  from  shareholders  have  disappeared  with  ongoing  dematerialization  and  advances  in 
technology.  As DTCC itself explains, paper is being steadily eliminating and the vaults are mostly 
empty.
342   Such  markets  as  the  United  Kingdom,
343 Germany
344 and  France
345 have  securities 
                                                       
342   According to DTCC, transactions in certificated securities constitute only about 0.01% of daily trading 
volume. Because storing large amounts of negotiable paper requires large, acclimatized, secure facilities, 
DTCC has for years advocated the elimination of paper, and the number of certificates it holds on deposit 
has steadily decreased. Between 2001 and 2007 the number of certificates DTC held in its vaults decreased 
by about 60% from approximately 6.7 to 2.7 million certificates. Michael Bellini, Dematerialization Makes 
Steady  Gains,  @DTCC NEWS  AND INFORMATION  FOR DTCC CUSTOMERS 12  (June  2007),  available  at 
www.dtcc.com. 
343   In  the  United  Kingdom,  Schedule  4  of  the  Uncertificated  Securities  Regulation  2001  (2001  Nr.  3755) 
provides that the name, address and holding of all shareholders of uncertificated shares be recorded in the 
settlement system and transferred to the issuer, and that the latter record the information in a "Record of 
Uncertificated Shares." See JOANNA BENJAMIN, MADELEINE YATES & GERALD MONTAGU, THE LAW OF 
GLOBAL CUSTODY §§ 9.16, 9.75 (2
nd ed. 2002).  This technical potential for a complete and up-to-date 
stockholders list has apparently not been sufficient to avoid the problems discussed in the Myners report 
(see  Part  III,  Section  ),  perhaps  because  not  enough  of  the  market  issues  uncertificated  shares  or 
stockholders  chose  not  to  provide  their  data.    However,  sec.  793  Companies  Act  2006  provides  U.K. 
companies the power to demand disclosure of beneficial owners. 
344   In Germany, Clearstream Banking Frankfurt AG generates sub-accounts in the custody accounts of its 
clearing participants by assigning an alphanumeric code to the entitlements held for specific investors and 
replicates this data in the data banks of the share registers attached to the settlement system.  See Donald, 
supra note *, at 145 et seq. 
345   In France, all shares are dematerialized but they are also legally bearer shares.  Thus the corporation issues 
the shares by booking them into an originating account with a custodian bank, and the bank then holds 
accounts for individual shareholders.  The wall of banking secrecy creates a wall that turns the "registered" 
shares  into  anonymous  bearer  shares.  All  shareholder  information  is,  however,  made  available  to  the 
Republic of France for tax purposes.  See Maffei, supra note 300, at 104.  
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settlement systems that can provide full information on a company's shareholders.  Thus there is no 
technological limitation to generating and distributing such information, as there was in the 1970's.  
Based on what we know about the rise of the indirect holding system, as discussed in Part II, it is not 
clear why this intermediary-based system remains.  This paper proposes as reasons a lack of awareness 
and financial interest. 
1. Unawareness 
A  lack  of  awareness  usually  derives  from  disinterest,  and  disinterest  is  usually  caused  by 
assumed irrelevance.  For example, even securities specialists were in the past often unaware of how 
credit derivatives functioned, but once the market began to use them heavily, relevance led to interest 
and interest to awareness.  The same might be said of Congress' attitude towards special purpose 
vehicles before and after the collapse of Enron.  Today, very few people think that the structure of 
securities settlement has any material relevance for anyone beyond the technicians who design such 
infrastructure.  This is rational as the current design will never cause a dramatic collapse, but only a 
slow bleeding of funds from issuers to intermediaries and a nagging inexactness in shareholder voting, 
coupled with a growing understanding that shareholders should be distant and estranged from the 
companies they own unless they are large enough to file a Schedule 13D.  Thus for years, the indirect 
holding of nearly the entire economy in the name of "Cede & Co." has appeared a curious oddity for 
those  who  noticed  it,  but  was  questioned  by  few.    An  article  by  Professor  J.  Robert  Brown,  Jr. 
published in 1988,
346 remained a lonely piece of scholarship on the subject for years, and drew very 
little  attention.    When  in  2004  The  Business  Roundtable  proposed  a  rule  to  shift  some  costs  of 
distributing proxy materials to intermediaries, they seemed unaware that the design of the indirect 
holding system was the cause of such costs problem.
347  The author of this paper filed a comment with 
the SEC on a securities settlement concept release shortly thereafter arguing that only a structural 
change  to  eliminate  the  need  to  communicate  through  intermediaries  would  allow  the  heavy 
externalities borne by issuers to be eliminated.
348  When The Business Roundtable next addressed the 
question in 2006, they had teamed up with the original proponents of the (issuer-driven) DRS system, 
the Securities Transfer Association and the Society of Corporate Secretaries, and requested that the 
                                                       
346   Brown, supra note 184. 
347   See  Request  for  Rulemaking  Concerning  Shareholder  Communications,  Nr.  4-493  (April  12,  2004), 
available at www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml.  
348   See Comment of David C. Donald, Research Associate, Institute for Law and Finance, on Concept Release: 
Securities Transactions Settlement, June 15, 2004, available at http://sec.gov/rules/concept/s71304.shtml   
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settlement system be reviewed for structural change.
349  Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock 
have also recently published a very interesting paper that follows in the footsteps of the Myners and 
Oxera reports discussed in Part III by showing how the indirect holding system creates costs and risks 
for the voting process in the United States.
350  As awareness grows of the causal connection between 
using  the  indirect  holding  system  and  the  high  costs  of  unnecessarily  ceding  shareholder  data  to 
intermediaries, interest in this hitherto obscure area will doubtless draw more attention. 
Another form of unawareness is institutional. At least since the 1976 Street Name Study, the 
SEC  has  assigned  the  supervision  of  securities  settlement  structures  to  one  division  –  Market 
Regulation – and the task of finding a cure for the shareholder communications problem to another 
division – Corporate Finance.  The resulting bureaucratic loop is perhaps best summarized in the 
conclusion of the Street Name Study, which is very informative about what happens when a problem 
falls between the institutional cracks: 
The TAD [Transfer Agent Depository] concept exhibits promise as an important long-
term alternative. It is not, however, a system for streamlining communications but rather 
an approach to a national clearance and settlement system which, as a by-product, would 
improve issuer-shareholder communications. Development of TAD, therefore, must be 
integrated with other developments in clearance and settlement.
351 
Although the Street Name Study punts to the Division of Market Regulation on the TAD, it would 
have been unsound professional practice for that Division to have focused on a simple "by-product" 
rather than the main issue.  Experts in the field of securities settlement generally understand efficiency 
and safety,
352 not secondary effects on shareholder communications, to be the focus of their interest.  
As a result, a system capable of generating a corporate governance "by-product" was not actively 
pursued.  On the other side of the Commission, the staff of the Division of Corporate Finance worked 
constantly  to  correct  the  problems  caused  by  the  congressional  order  of  immobilization  through 
enacting and amending Rules 14a-13, 14a-16, 14b-1 and 14b-2. In this way, one Division tugged in 
one direction while the other pulled in the other, apparently prevented by their divisional mandates 
from  overcoming  this  somewhat  myopic  institutional  professionalism.
353   Recently,  however,  this 
                                                       
349   See Comments of Steve Odland, Chairman and CEO, Office Depot, Inc., Chairman, Corporate Governance 
Task  Force,  Business  Roundtable,  on  Internet  Publication  Rule,  February  10,  2006,  available  at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71005.shtml.  
350   See Kahan & Rock, supra note 209. 
351   SEC STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 108, at 43. 
352   See SCOTT, supra note 2, at 278 ("The chief aims of clearing and settlement are efficiency and safety"). 
353   Brown, supra note 184, at 715 ("By promoting immobilization, the Commission essentially implemented a 
policy designed to increase the use of street name accounts. Thus, in the 1970s, the Commission both  
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barrier seems to have been broken by seating proxy and settlement structure experts at the same tables 
in a recent roundtable session at the SEC.
354 
A third form of unawareness is the failure to see a conflict of interest in allowing intermediaries 
themselves to design a system that benefits intermediaries while creating additional costs for issuers 
and  shareholders.    Leading  studies  do  examine  the  corporate  governance  of  central  securities 
depositories and other settlement entities,
355 but they focus traditional problems of utilities like access 
to services
356 and charges to system users.  When the interests of the broader group of "stakeholders" – 
which includes issuers – is mentioned, costs are assumed to be limited to the price of clearing and 
settling trades,
357 and do not include indirect communication or the prices of downstream entities 
having to unbundle super-netted sums.  One article, by the legal staff of the European Central Bank 
does point out that in the case of uncertificated shares, placing the register in which the shares are 
originated in the hands of a CSD will give the latter extensive power over whether and issuer has 
access to the capital market.
358  No major studies by international organizations or regulatory bodies 
refer to an awareness of this conflict of interest.   
2.  Interest 
Part II discussed the strong interests that brokers and banks had in the 1970's to establish a 
centralized depository system in New York City.  The creation of the NASDAQ system had destroyed 
a New York monopoly on the OTC market, and the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments placed the 
NYSE in the most severe competitive struggle it had ever seen at a time that New York City itself was 
sliding towards bankruptcy.  At the time, it was hoped that setting up a central certificate service in 
New York would guarantee the city at least a certain amount of enduring centrality and perhaps bring 
concrete advantages to local institutions.  The states of both the markets and of technology spoke 
strongly for such a centralized system.  Today, with different markets and different technology (as 
well as the undisputed dominance of New York), these reasons no longer remain, but only the market 
participants themselves, the clearing entities and exchange members, are in a position to launch a new 
                                                                                                                                                                      
encouraged the use of street name ownership and recognized that these owners were not fully integrated 
into the proxy process.") 
354   See List of Participants for the SEC Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, available at www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-parts052407.htm. 
355   THE GROUP OF THIRTY supra note 103, Recommendation 17, p. 50 et seq. 
356   Id. at Recommendation 18, p. 52 et seq. 
357   Id. at Recommendation 19, p. 54 et seq. 
358   Daniela Russo, Terry L. Hart, Maria Chiara Malaguti & Chryssa Papathanassiou, "Governance of Securities 
Settlement Systems," European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 21 (October 2004), p. 23 et seq.   
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system.  As Prof. Robert Schwarz and Dr. Reto Francioni, explain, issuers have little place in the 
decision-making of stock exchange infrastructure: 
Historically,  exchanges  have  been  membership  organizations,  and  for  a  membership 
organization  the  answer  is straightforward:  The  broker-dealer  intermediaries, who  are 
their members, are their primary customers. With a membership organization, the other 
two constituents (investors and the listed companies) are important primarily because 
they are critical for the profitability of the members. Nevertheless, the bottom line is, with 
a membership organization, the interests of the intermediaries come first.
359 
This principle of broker-dealer control of the market infrastructure was made painfully obvious in the 
manner that the DRS system, which was conceived as an issuer driven project, was turned into a 
service option of DTCC, for which issuers now pay fees.  The listing of the major stock exchanges 
may shift this balance of power as institutional investors take larger stakes in the NYSE and the 
Nasdaq Stock Market and become aware of problems that the indirect holding system causes for 
shareholder communication and voting. However, issuers remain distant from the actual operation of 
the market's trading and settlement systems, and should be able to look to the SEC to promote their 
interests in the SRO rulemaking process. To date, however, it appears that the SEC has remained 
unaware of any conflict of interest between issuers and intermediaries. 
Broker-dealers obtain a number of advantages from the indirect holding system, although it is 
difficult to estimate their value.  First among the benefits is likely to be customer loyalty.
360  Like a 
garage that stores its customer's winter tires during the warmer seasons, a broker that has its customer's 
shares knows he will return, if only with a request to close his account.  This means that the broker 
always  has  its  customer's  current  address,  and  can contact him  to offer its services  and potential 
transactions.  It also means that the broker will always have a last chance to keep its customer from 
changing brokers, a last opportunity to make a special offer and win back a customer.  The advantage 
of this position is certainly obvious when compared to one in which shareholders could contact any 
broker based on price and reputation to make a sale of shares held with the issuer in a register/account.  
A second advantage that brokers may enjoy under some circumstances is an increase in assets under 
management.  To avoid the risk that the broker will engage in unnecessary transactions to drive up her 
commissions ("churning"), some customers contract to compensate their brokers with a "wrap fee", 
according  to  which  commissions  are  calculated  in  relation  to  an  agreed-upon  aggregation  of 
transactions executed, advice rendered and total assets that the broker holds under management for the 
                                                       
359   SCHWARTZ & FRANCIONI, supra note 43, at 93. 
360   See WELLES, supra note 60, at 144.  
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customer.
361  The indirect holding system brings assets under the broker's control more or less by force 
majeure, thus increasing the wrap fee.  A third reason could be the prestige of controlling the "broker 
vote"  often  used  to  support  management.    Without  a  system  in  which  proxy  materials  passed 
necessarily through brokers, this power would not exist. 
The value of shareholder information to brokers is evidenced by the force with which they 
defend their possession of it.  Customer lists have for brokers a value that is certainly comparable to 
"leads" for salespeople. In the course of their 1976 Street Name Study, the SEC inquired whether the 
creation of a NOBO list would violate the privacy of shareholders.  The perspective of brokers was 
evident in the fact that they found a release of NOBO lists to endanger their customers' privacy,
362 
while  on  the  contrary  nearly  88 %  of  the  shareholders  responded  that  they  were  prepared  to 
unconditionally provide the requested information to issuers.
363  It is difficult to understand why the 
SEC found it only worthy of mention in a footnote that brokers were concerned that release of that 
data could mean losing customers to competitors.
364  Staff counsel for the SEC has told the author of 
this paper that brokers now consider shareholder data their own property.
365  This has come a long way 
from the understanding of immobilization as a "temporary" stop on the way to the "certificateless 
society".  
The motives of companies like Broadridge are even stronger.  They may look at the creation of 
a truly functional system of direct registration the same way that London's famed boatmen looked at 
the building of more bridges across the Thames – as an open threat to their raison d'être.  These 
service companies draw their profit directly from the inefficiencies of the indirect holding system, and 
it took little time for Senator Frank Lautenberg's former partners to turn ADP, the company that he 
helped build,
366 into an indispensible part of the market structure after Congress ordered the imposition 
                                                       
361   For a discussion of "wrap fees" or "wrap accounts", also with particular regard to churning, see NORMAN S. 
POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 16.01 (2
nd ed., 2001); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, 
at §8-C-1; LAURA S. PRUITT, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 34 (2006). 
362   SEC STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 108, at 40. 
363   Id. at 41. 
364   Id. at 40, footnote 84. 
365   Telephone converstation with member of legal staff from Division of Market Regulation, November 2004. 
366   Senator Frank R. Lautenberg entered the U.S. Senate in 1983. See AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC. 
ADP 50
TH ANNIVERSARY, 1949-1999 pp. 23, 26 (1999), available at  http://www.investquest.com/iq/a/adp/. 
This is well after debate and voting on the 1975 Act, and thus he could have had nothing to do with 
advocating the building of the immobilization damn so that a reservoir of backed up communications would 
form on which his former company could feed.  ADP formed its Investor Communication Services in 1989.  
See Id. at 32.  
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of immobilization.
367 Although such services are to be praised for allowing the U.S. markets to excel 
despite a crippling disruption of shareholder communications, their services would all but disappear if 
shareholders or their chosen agents were registered directly with issuers.  This makes it all the more 
surprising that regulators interested in studying the indirect holding system and its problems turn to 
service providers like ADP or Broadridge for unbiased information on the market. 
Certainly, such intermediaries and service providers have no reason to advise that the system be 
changed  in  such  a  way  to  eliminate  their  central  role  as  registered  shareholders  under  § 17A(e) 
Exchange Act and as the creators of "security entitlements" under Article 8 UCC. If for no other 
reason than respect for their own stability, reliability and skills, they will advise that they should 
remain in this central – and profitable – position.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explained how the choice of the indirect holding system for securities settlement 
forced U.S. issuers to cede their shareholder data to intermediaries.  Part II described how the paper-
intensive process of transferring certificated securities led to a market failure in the 1960's.  It further 
showed how the indirect holding system was seen as a temporary, second-best solution pending the 
dematerialization of shares and improvements in communications technology.  In the mean time, the 
effects of separating beneficial and record ownership led to an expensive and inefficient process of 
shareholder communication and voting.  Part III examined this process, whose inefficiency offered 
service providers the profitable niche industry of assisting issuers to distribute proxy materials through 
and around extensive chains of intermediaries.  Part IV explained how, when law and technology had 
developed sufficiently to allow a return to a system of direct issuer-shareholder relationships via a 
direct registration system, intermediaries acted rationally to absorb DRS into the DTTC system, and 
continue to enjoy their central role between issuers and shareholders.  This Part also demonstrated how 
a  truly  effective  direct  registration  system  could  provide  the  transparency  necessary  to  address 
problems such as "empty" voting and could arguably spread the costs of securities settlement more 
equitably through broader-based netting, rather than pushing them downstream.  Part V argued that 
although the indirect holding system and its negative effects are no longer necessary, a combination of 
unawareness and interest serves to perpetuate a perceived need for issuers and shareholders to cede 
their ownership/governance relationship to a custodian utility, which then offers to put them back into 
                                                       
367   Between 1989 and 1999, ADP's market share for the distribution of proxy materials to shareholders whose 
shares were held in "street name" rose to over 90%. See Id. at 32.  
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contact, for a fee.  By explaining the interests behind choices made and the possibility of alternative 
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